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Human capital investment is of prime interest for many countries at varying stages of de-
velopment. Knowing both the determinants and the impact of schooling is central for well-
designed policy. This dissertation addresses both respects by examining the determinants
of secondary school enrollment in Indonesia, and the impact of higher education in South
Korea.
It is not always clear to what extent limited educational attainment in developing coun-
tries is driven by households’ demand (e.g. low expectation regarding labor market returns),
as opposed to supply and income constraints. Indeed, low perceived returns to education
may lead to limited human capital investment even in the absence of binding supply and
income constraints.
In Chapter 1, I begin from the observation that many countries spend substantial re-
sources inducing individuals to attend school. Despite this, high dropout rates are common,
particularly when students transition between education levels. To explain this pattern, pre-
vious research has focused on supply side factors, such as decreased number of school slots
or longer commute times. In contrast, this paper explores a demand side reason for high
dropout rates between schooling levels: a nonlinear increase in wage returns from completing
the final grade of an education level – a sheepskin effect. I investigate whether schooling
decisions in Indonesia are consistent with perceived sheepskin effects. Using four types of
income shocks that range from idiosyncratic to systemic (unemployment, crop loss, drought,
and financial crises), I test if negative shocks affect enrollment differentially across differ-
ent grade levels. As in the previous literature, negative shocks reduce children’s enrollment
probabilities on average. However, consistent with perceived sheepskin effects, this impact
is strongly mitigated for students who enter the final grades of junior or senior high school.
Moreover, even poor households exhibit this behavior indicating that even the poor are able
to continue investments in education when they perceive returns to be sufficiently high.
The remainder of the dissertation begins from the observation that in low income coun-
tries most gains in education attainment have come from expansions at the primary or
secondary level. In contrast, middle and higher income countries have seen rapid increases
in higher education enrollments. The pace of growth varies considerably, with historically
low attainment countries such as South Korea, Belgium and France experienced more than
a 40% point increase in the percentage of population with some tertiary education. Despite
the salience of these trends, there is limited credible empirical evidence on their impact due
to the difficulty in finding a credible exogenous variation.
To address this question, chapters 2 and 3 utilize an unusual policy change in South
Korea; the 1980 education reform, which mandated an increase in the freshman enrollment
quota by 30 percent nationwide.
Chapter 2 (joint work with Wooram Park) estimates the impact of higher education on
labor market outcomes and saving behavior of the household. We use the discrete change in
the opportunity to obtain higher education across adjacent cohorts to implement a regression
discontinuity design. We find that college education has a substantial positive effect on labor
income, employment probability as well as on household savings. We also find that college
education reduces the probability of job loss during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.
Chapter 3 (joint work with Jisun Baek and Wooram Park) estimates the causal effect of
higher education on health related outcomes. Also using a regression discontinuity design,
we confirm that the cohorts that are more likely to be affected by the policy have a higher
fraction of individuals with college education. However, we do not find evidence of positive
health returns to higher education. In particular, we find that the cohorts with higher
proportion of college graduates are not less likely to experience disease or report poor health
status. Moreover, we find that higher education has limited effects on health behaviors such
as smoking and drinking.
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Chapter 1
Human Capital Investment When
Sheepskin Effects Matter: Evidence
from Income Shocks in Indonesia
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1.1 Introduction
Developing countries spend substantial resources to induce individuals to attend school
and accumulate human capital. Despite this, high dropout rates are common, particularly
when students transition between education levels as illustrated in Figure 1.1.1 Previous
research has studied supply side factors as the main reason for this pattern, e.g., students
transitioning to a new level might encounter barriers to progression such as decreased num-
ber of slots, minimum score requirements, or longer commute times (World Bank, 2009;
UNESCO, 2012).
Much less attention has been paid to whether factors related to demand for schooling can
partially account for these schooling patterns. Recent research suggests that understanding
individuals’ responsiveness to real and perceived returns to schooling is indeed important to
education policy (e.g., MacLeod and Urquiola, 2009; Jensen, 2010, 2012; Oster and Steinberg,
2013). Specifically, empirical investigation has found that increases in the perceived returns
to education increase the likelihood of enrollment. However, little attempt has been made
to apply this insight to understanding dropout or transition decisions.
I address this gap by testing whether the timing of dropout behavior is consistent with
the perception of sheepskin effects in the labor market. A sheepskin effect exists when the
wage return to an additional year of schooling is higher if that year allows a student to
complete a school level (Card, 1999).2 If parents believe that there are sheepskin effects,
1Figure 1 illustrates this using data from Indonesia; the observed pattern is common to other developing
countries. Each point on the graph denotes the enrollment probability of students entering the given grade
conditional on enrollment in the previous grade. The probabilities remain above 95% up to 6th grade–the
end of primary school–but then fall below 95% for the 7th grade. For 10th grade, the beginning of senior
high school, they fall below 90%.
2In other words, a sheepskin effect is a wage premium associated with a completion of an education level,
in addition to the usual linear returns to accumulated years of schooling implied a là Mincer. Sheepskin
effects could be present if credentials have a signaling value, or if there is actual productivity gain in obtaining
the degree. Regardless of whether schooling signals or augments productivity, it increases lifetime earnings
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then one should expect their education investment choices to differ depending on how close
their child is to completing an educational level. In other words, perceived sheepskin effects
provide a source of variation in the demand for schooling by grade level. While sheepskin
effects have been extensively studied using wage data, there has been no evidence on how
they affect human capital investment decisions.3
The central challenge in addressing this question is disentangling demand from supply side
factors that determine individual decisions. To overcome this challenge, I exploit variation in
the timing of income shocks that affect households. If households are credit constrained, then
shocks may substantially increase their marginal utility of current consumption, raising the
cost, in terms of utility, of keeping their children in school. This increase in the opportunity
cost of enrollment holds for all grade levels. However, returns to an extra year of schooling
will be higher closer to the final years of schooling if there are sheepskin effects. Thus,
the cross-grade variation in enrollment decisions in the face of these shocks is informative
about the strength of demand factors. The idea is that if enrollment decisions at a given
grade are less responsive to negative income shocks than in other grades, it must be that the
benefit from completing that grade is relatively high. Specifically, I argue that a perception
of sheepskin effects causes enrollment decisions to be least responsive to income shocks in
the last grade of a given education level.
I implement this strategy using data from the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) for
1997 and 2000. Formally, I construct two binary variables. The first identifies households
suffering a negative income shock; the second identifies students who will enter the final
grade of a given education level. The perception of a sheepskin effect is identified by the
and hence represents a good investment for individuals (Psacharopoulos, 1994). The origin of the term
relates to the fact that diplomas were once printed on sheepskin.
3Earlier work using wage data include Hungerford and Solon (1987) and Belman and Heywood (1991).
For recent work, see for example, Jaeger and Page (1996) and Tyler, Murnane, and Willett (2000)
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interaction of the two variables, which captures the differential response to income shocks for
students entering the last grade relative to others. The hypothesis is that sheepskin effects
induce perceived returns to schooling to be higher for the last grade of an education level.
Therefore, while a negative income shock may lead parents to withdraw students from school
on average, this reduction in investment should be smaller if the child faces enrollment in
the final grade.
The Indonesian setting allows me to consider shocks that range from idiosyncratic to
systemic: unemployment spells, crop loss, drought, and the Indonesian financial crisis. Un-
employment may affect households idiosyncratically, whereas crop loss and drought have
aggregate effects at the local level. The financial crisis affects the entire country. Previous
research has often used aggregate shocks, especially rainfall (Jensen, 2000; Björkman, 2006),
which may affect the opportunity cost of schooling through changes in the outside labor
market. Therefore, finding consistent results across both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks
is desirable and helps dispel concerns specific to each type of shock.
As expected, I find that shocks adversely impact the probability of enrollment in the
subsequent year for affected students. This impact, however, is mitigated for students who
expect to enter the final grades of junior and senior high school. For instance, students
whose households experience unemployment are about 6 percentage points more likely to
drop out, on average. This effect essentially disappears, however, for students who suffer the
shock but are entering the last grades of junior or senior high school. Moreover, I find that
even poor households that do not hold any buffer stocks and hence might be more credit
constrained exhibit this pattern of human capital investment decisions. The findings are
consistent across the different income shocks.
To further explore this idea, I utilize the fact that when the Asian financial crisis hit
Indonesia in early 1998, the households at the bottom of the income distribution were the
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most affected (Thomas et al., 2004). Consistent with the previous patterns, I find that grade
progression was hindered for students in households most vulnerable to the financial crisis,
but students entering the last grade did not drop out in response to the crisis.
The identifying assumption behind my research design is that the timing of the shock
is exogenous to the grade the student is in. While this seems plausible, it is difficult to
guarantee for all the shocks I consider, particularly since unemployment and crop loss are
self-reported. Suppose, for example, that parents whose children are in the last grade of a
given school level are less likely to experience unemployment – perhaps they realize this is an
important moment and exert extra effort to stay employed. In this scenario the shocks are
not as good as randomly assigned and the estimates may be biased. Two pieces of evidence
help rule out such concerns. First, I show that the likelihood of households’ reporting a
shock is uncorrelated with their children’s grade level. Second, I implement the strategy
using rainfall shocks and the Asian financial crisis, which are likely to be exogenous, and
find similar results.
Could the above findings be explained by demand factors other than perception of sheep-
skin effects? One possibility is selection on ability. This implies that more able students will
have more years of schooling conditional on other observable characteristics, i.e., average
ability is increasing in grade. Then, faced with a negative income shock, parents are more
likely to keep the child closer to completing an education level enrolled because the perceived
returns to a year of schooling is higher for students with higher ability and not because re-
turns are particularly high in the last grade due to sheepskin effects. My research design
overcomes this concern by comparing students who are in their final year to those in both
the grade before and the grade after. If the results are driven by selection, I should find
enrollment responsiveness to be monotonically decreasing in grade. However, the estimated
response to income shocks exhibits a non-monotonic relationship in grade around the last
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grade of junior high school. Specifically, I observe that enrollment in the last grade of junior
high school is less sensitive to income shocks relative to not only the penultimate grade of
junior high but also the first grade of senior high school. This pattern of enrollment responses
is consistent with sheepskin effects, but not with selection on ability.
Another possibility for returns to schooling to vary by grade is changes in outside op-
portunities. If physical strength or years of schooling matter in the labor market, average
foregone earnings are expected to monotonically increase by grade. This would imply that
the responsiveness of enrollment to income shocks should monotonically increase by grade,
which again is inconsistent with observed patterns.
In short, the pattern of grade-related heterogeneous responses to income shocks suggests
that my results are not driven by these alternative explanations. Sheepskin effects are most
consistent with the observed patterns.
This is the first paper to study how sheepskin effects might influence human capital
investment decisions. This approach complements the previous literature which tests for
sheepskin effects directly, i.e. using wage data for individuals who have already completed
their schooling (e.g., Jaeger and Page, 1996; Park, 1994; Tyler et al., 2000). These papers
document the presence of additional wage returns to completion of an education level.4 In
contrast, this paper provides the first evidence that schooling decisions themselves respond
to perceived sheepskin effects.
Previous research has found that households in developing countries cannot fully smooth
their expenditure across periods when they suffer a negative income shock (Jacoby, 1994;
4Using data from the 1991 and 1992 March CPS, Jaeger and Page (1996) estimate that the return to
a high school diploma conditional on having 12 years of schooling is 18 percent; similarly, the return to
receiving a Bachelor’s degree conditional on having 16 years of schooling is 33 percent. Tyler, Murnane, and
Willett (2000) find that the General Education Development credential (GED) itself has value in the labor
market and increases annual earnings of young white dropouts by 10 to 19 percent. They use state variation
in GED granting score, so the estimates measure the wage premium for those who marginally passed the
GED.
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Jensen, 2000).5 As a result, investment in their children’s education was found to be sensitive
to income fluctuations. I find that while this is true, there is heterogeneity in how much
education investment is reduced due to nonlinear returns to schooling, such that students in
the final years are essentially not affected by these shocks.
My findings are also related to the literature on long term consequences of an adverse
event before adulthood (Almond and Currie, 2011). Specifically, I observe that where in-
dividuals are in the human capital investment process– e.g. if they are facing enrollment
in a final grade within an education level– can determine how they fare when adverse cir-
cumstances hit. Particularly in the case of the financial crisis, the timing of the shock not
only affects human capital accumulation, but may also affect when individuals enter the
labor market. If students are hit in a non-sheepskin grade, they are more likely to enter the
labor market at an unfavorable point with potential long term consequences (Oreopoulos,
von Wachter, and Heisz, 2012a).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of
the education system in Indonesia. Section 3 presents the data and the construction of the
household shock variables. Section 4 lays out the empirical strategy followed by discussion
of the results in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Background on the Indonesian School System
The Indonesian education system consists of six years of elementary school, three years of
junior high school and three years of senior high school. In 1984, the government of Indonesia
declared 6 years of compulsory schooling to be mandatory. In 1994, the government further
announced the goal of reaching 9 years of compulsory schooling by the late 1990s, thereby
5Similar findings emerge in Thomas et al. (2004) and Duryea and Arends-Kuenning (2003)
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ensuring all children finish junior high school. However, enforcement has not been as strong
as primary compulsory schooling, and many children still get fewer than 9 years.
While Indonesia has primary net enrollment rates well over 90 percent and has achieved
universal primary education, completion rates in junior and senior high school are still far
below the average for developed countries. Out of all students who entered elementary
school in the 1991/1992 school year, 71 percent graduated from elementary school and only
51 percent reached the first year of junior high school (Jones and Hagul, 2001). In particular,
sharp attrition occurs in the transitions between elementary school and junior high school
and between junior and senior high school, as displayed in Figure 1.
By the mid 1990s, the gender disparity in education attainment, particularly in terms
of enrollment, had been nearly eliminated. The female-to-male net enrollment ratio at the
elementary and junior high level has been around 100 percent since 1995, and for senior high
level has fluctuated between 95 and 104 percent in the same period. Even for the households
in the lowest income quintile, there is a negligible difference in net enrollment rate between
girls and boys up to senior high school. Consistent with these facts, the findings in the paper
do not display different patterns between girls and boys.
Pecuniary factors seem to be one of the main reasons for non-enrollment. Out of the 363
individuals who reported a reason for stopping school in the 2000 wave of Indonesia Family
and Life Survey (IFLS), 45 percent chose either not being able to afford schooling or helping
parents earn money as the answer.
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1.3 Data and Construction of Negative Income Shocks
1.3.1 Data
The Indonesia Family and Life Survey (IFLS) is an on-going longitudinal household and
community survey, which is representative of 83 percent of the Indonesian population.6 I
use two rounds of this survey, 1997 and 2000. I exclude college students from the sample
as Indonesian higher education consists of various institutions that take anywhere from 1
to 4 or more years to complete, which makes it difficult to determine which students will
enter the final grade before completion. Therefore, I restrict my analysis to students who
are enrolled in a given school year and can potentially enter an elementary, junior, or senior
high school in the subsequent school year.
My empirical strategy is to take a sample of students enrolled in a given school year and
investigate whether those students whose household suffered a shock in that year are more
or less likely to enroll in the subsequent year, depending on their grade level. Note that in
Indonesia the school year begins in late July and ends in June. IFLS asks individuals whether
they are currently enrolled and whether they attended school in the previous school year. I
use this information to construct my sample. From IFLS 1997, I take students enrolled in
the 1996/1997 school year; from IFLS 2000 I take students enrolled in the 1999/2000 school
year. The survey elicits completed grade and the final education level for each individual. I
use this information to compute the grade level a student will enter in the following school
year. The outcome of interest is enrollment status in the subsequent school year, which
corresponds to enrollment status in 1997/1998 and 2000/2001 school year for IFLS 1997 and
6The sample was randomly chosen from a nationally representative sample from used in the 1993 SUSE-
NAS, which is a socioeconomic survey of Indonesia. IFLS contains about 30,000 individuals living in 13
of the 27 provinces in the country. The 13 provinces are North Sumatra, West Sumatra, South Sumatra,
Lampung, DKI Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, DI Yogyakarta, East Java, Bali, West Nusa Tenggara,
South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi.
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IFLS 2000 students, respectively.
The survey also contains self-reported information about negative income shocks at the
household level; namely, whether the household members experienced unemployment or
whether the household suffered from crop loss. It also records the corresponding month
and year of the incidence if the shock occurred. In the next section, I explain in detail the
construction of the shock in relation to the empirical strategy.
To explore whether the impact of the shock varies depending on the household’s ownership
of buffer stocks, I use ownership of savings information from IFLS to distinguish households
with and without buffer stocks.
Rainfall data is constructed using University of Delaware Terrestrial Precipitation: 1900-
2010 Gridded Monthly Time Series (version 3.01). Rainfall is measured for 0.5 degree
latitude by 0.5 degree longitude grids from 20 nearby weather stations. I match the latitude
and longitude of Indonesia district centroids to the nearest latitude and longitude grid node
in the rainfall data, which allows construction of monthly rainfall data for each district.7 The
measure of interest is rainfall during the first three months of the monsoon season, following
Skoufias et al. (2011). Rainfall shocks are defined as deviations from the district’s usual
rainfall, where the district specific rainfall distribution is computed over the years 1970 to
2000. Details can be found in the next section.
Table 1.1 reports summary statistics. It shows that 53 percent of the sample students
reside in rural villages and the mode of schooling level for household heads is elementary
school, consisting of 47 percent of the sample. The majority of the households in the sample
own their home and uses electricity at home. About 30 percent of the students live in a
household that holds any savings.
7The district coordinate information is from online dataset of Maccini and Yang (2009).
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1.3.2 Negative Income Shock Construction
I consider four measures of negative income shocks that households can experience: i)
a member of the household becomes unemployed, ii) crop loss, iii) rainfall shortage in the
household’s district and iv) financial crisis in the entire country. I define an indicator variable
Shock, that takes a value of one if the shock occurred in a given school year, before the
beginning of the subsequent school year.
To be more specific, for IFLS 1997, I take students who were enrolled in 1996/1997 school
year and explore how a shock during that school year affects these students’ enrollment
probability in the subsequent 1997/1998 school year. I construct a shock variable in this
way to account for the fact that dropping out tends to occur between school years rather
than during a given year. This is likely to stem from the fact that beginning a new year
might require fixed costs such as buying supplies, text books, etc. This implies that if a
shock occurs during a given school year that the student is already enrolled in, the next
dropout decision is likely to occur at the beginning of the new school year. Following the
same logic for IFLS 2000, conditional on enrollment in 1999/2000 school year, the outcome
variable is the probability of enrollment in the subsequent 2000/2001 school year with the
shock variable equal to one if the shock occurred during 1999/2000 school year.
The IFLS questionnaire asks the most knowledgeable household member about the oc-
currence and the timing of the following incidences: unemployment of household members
and crop loss. Using this information, I construct an indicator variable for negative income
shocks that takes a value of one if the household reports to have experienced either type of
incidence in a given year. I also create separate indicators for unemployment of household
members and crop loss.
While the timing of the household income shock should be arguably exogenous to the
grade that the child is in, because the central identification assumption is the orthogonality
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between the two, I employ two additional sources of income shocks that are not self-declared
in IFLS. First, I construct a shock using an observable source, namely rainfall. It is natural
to use rainfall shortage, given the prevalence of participation in agriculture with about 45
percent of the population employed in this sector during the period of analysis and the
importance of rice farming in Indonesia. For example, both Maccini and Yang (2009) and
Skoufias, Essama-Nssah, and Katayama (2011) point to lack of rainfall as a potent shock
that affects households’ welfare and resource allocation in Indonesia. Studies using rainfall
shocks in rice farming regions point out that wet season or monsoon season rainfall shocks are
particularly important for rice production.8 To specify a shock similar to Skoufias, Essama-
Nssah, and Katayama (2011), I define post-onset rainfall as total amount of rainfall during
the first three months of the rainy season.9 Since each province in Indonesia experiences the
monsoon onset at different months ranging from September to November, I use the onset
month information used in Maccini and Yang (2009) and create post-onset rainfall data
accordingly for each district.
To create the rainfall shock variable, I first create post-onset rainfall for each district
and year between 1970 and 2000. Based on this, I calculate a 30 year post-onset rainfall
distribution for each district. I define a district to experience a negative rainfall shock if the
post-onset rainfall in a given year falls in the first decile of the historical distribution in that
district.
Figure A.1 shows a nonparametric relationship between post-onset rainfall and farm
revenue for the agricultural households in the sample. I regress log farm revenue on post-onset
rainfall decile dummies and controls including year and district fixed effects. Each decile
8Jensen (2000), Skoufias et al. (2011), Kaur (2012)
9The paper finds that for rural households in Indonesia Java province, negative rainfall shocks defined
as shortage of post monsoon onset rainfall have an adverse impact on farming households’ welfare.
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dummy is an indicator for whether the district’s post-onset rainfall in that year fell within
the given decile of the district’s historical post-onset rainfall distribution. This figure plots
the coefficient estimate for each decile dummy and its corresponding 95 percent confidence
intervals. It provides verification that a post-onset rainfall in the first decile is associated
with lower average farm revenue and hence appropriately identifies an income shock. To
confirm the validity of the rainfall shock, I also perform a regression of farm revenue on the
post-onset rainfall shock variable with controls, finding that the estimate of rainfall shock
has a negative and significant effect on the farm revenue with an 10.99 F-stat value.
Finally, I construct an income shock measure utilizing the Asian Financial Crisis. The
Asian Financial Crisis hit Indonesia starting at the end of 1997 and worsened during early
1998. Relative to its level in 1997, GDP in 1998 declined by over 12 percent (Thomas et al.,
2004). Findings in Thomas et al. (2004) suggest that the Indonesian financial crisis had a
particularly severe impact on poorer households. Therefore, I define the variable Shock to
indicate households that are located at the bottom pth percentile of the income distribution.
p takes values of 5, 10 and 25. The household income measure I use is pre-crisis (IFLS 1997)
log per capita expenditure. The reason for using a pre-crisis measure rather than post is to
take into account that households’ expenditure rankings may have shifted as a result of the
crisis, such that IFLS 2000 per capita expenditure may not be informative about financial
vulnerability during the crisis.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
The goal of my empirical strategy is to identify the impact of the perception of sheepskin
effects on enrollment decisions. To isolate the effect of perceived returns while holding other
supply factors constant, I exploit income shocks that increase the relative cost of enrollment
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for all grades. I then infer the strength of the demand factors determining schooling decisions
from cross-grade variations in enrollment decisions following these income shocks.
My hypothesis is that if households believe that returns to schooling are higher for final
grades that allow the completion of an education level, then students will be less likely to
drop out in response to adverse income shocks, consistent with sheepskin effects.
To examine if this pattern of schooling decisions exists, I explore, conditional on en-
rollment in a given school year, the probability that a student whose household suffered
a negative income shock will maintain enrollment in the subsequent school year. I test
whether this enrollment responses to income shocks differ depending on whether the grade
that a student enters in the subsequent school year is the final one in an education level.10
Since the outcome is an indicator for enrollment, I expect the coefficient on the shock
variable to be negative, as declines in their households’ income should drive students to drop
out of school. I assume that at least some households are credit constrained, and thus their
limited ability to smooth consumption forces them to withdraw their children from school.
In the estimation, investment behavior consistent with the perception of a sheepskin
effect is identified by the interaction between an indicator for entering the last grade of an
education level and an indicator for suffering an income shock. My hypothesis predicts that
the coefficient on the interaction term is positive, i.e. the student’s probability of dropout
in the presence of a negative shock is less if he or she is entering the last grade of a given
education level.
10Normally, without sheepskin effects, the returns to an additional year of schooling are linear. If individ-
uals are optimizing over their lifetime, all students- not only those in the final year of a given level- would
take sheepskin effects into account when calculating the returns to an addition year of schooling; i.e. the
impact of sheepskin effects would be continuous. However, in fact the returns to schooling may be convex or
concave in some grade ranges, and the exact shape is theoretically ambiguous because of income volatility
or other uncertainties. Due to concerns with statistical power, I make a reasonable assumption that returns
are linear for other grades, and nonlinear for the final ones; I thus focus on final grades to identify sheepskin
effects.
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The basic specification is the following:
Enrolliht = α + βLastit + γShockht + δLastit ∗ Shockht +Xht + φt + εiht (1.1)
Lastit is an indicator variable that equals one if the grade student i will enter at year t
is the final grade of a given education level. Students who will enter grades 6, 9 and 12 for
elementary, junior high and senior high school respectively, are assigned a value of one and
zero otherwise. Shockht is an indicator for students’ household h experiencing a negative
income shock at year t. My hypothesis implies that γ is negative and δ is positive; the
direct impact of the shock reduces the likelihood of enrollment by γ, but the impact of the
shock is lessened by δ for students with Lastit equal to one. Controls include district fixed
effects, year fixed effects and dummies for household head’s education levels, an indicator for
rural residence and an indicator for female. Standard errors are clustered at the household
level using unemployment, crop loss and financial crisis shock. For estimations using rainfall
shock, standard errors are clustered at the district level.
As the additional wage premium from completing a given education level is likely to
differ across education levels, the magnitude of the perception of sheepskin effects can be
expected to vary as well. Therefore, I estimate equation (2), which allows the direct impact
of the shock as well as the perceived sheepskin effect to vary for elementary, junior high and
senior high school. I set senior high level as the omitted category, hence the coefficient on
Lastit ∗ Shockht estimates the impact of perceived sheepskin effects for enrollment decisions
in senior high school. I additionally include interactions of the variables in equation (1) with
an indicator for elementary school, ESit, and junior high school, JHit to construct equation
(2). The coefficients on the interactions Lastit ∗ Shockht ∗ESit and Lastit ∗ Shockht ∗ JHit ,
will capture the relative magnitude of sheepskin effect perception for elementary school and
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junior high school relative to high school.
The resulting specification is the following:
Enrolliht = α+ β1Lastit + β2Lastit ∗ ESit + β3Lastit ∗ JHit + γ1Shockht + γ2Shockht ∗ ESit + γ3Shockht ∗ JHit
+ δ1Lastit ∗ Shockht + δ2Lastit ∗ Shockht ∗ ESit + δ3Lastit ∗ Shockht ∗ JHit + ESit + JHit +Xht + φt + εiht
(1.2)
The identifying assumption necessary to estimate the perceived sheepskin effect on school-
ing decisions is that the timing of the negative household shock is exogenous to the grade
that students are in. A possible threat to identification arises from the fact that the shock
is self-reported in the IFLS dataset. For example, the results could be biased if a parent is
more or less likely to report a shock when her child is in the last grade. I resolve this possible
concern in appendix Table A.1, which shows that being in the last grade is uncorrelated with
an incidence of negative household income shocks.
In addition, two pieces of evidence using a non self-reported income shocks help allevi-
ate this concern. I execute similar estimation exercises using shortage of rainfall and the
Asian financial crisis as sources of exogenous negative income shocks and obtain qualitatively
equivalent findings. The results are presented in Section 5.3. and Section 5.4., respectively.
1.5 Results
I present findings on (i) the adverse impact of negative household income shocks on human
capital decisions (ii) how human capital investment response is consistent with perception
of sheepskin effects, i.e., the negative impact of shocks on enrollment decisions is mitigated
for students in the final grades of junior and senior high school (iii) how even the poor
households without buffer stocks exhibit this pattern of schooling decisions.
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1.5.1 Unemployment and Crop Loss Shocks
In this section, I estimate heterogenous enrollment responses to household income shocks,
using self-reported information in IFLS. A binary negative income shock variable takes a
value of one if household experiences either unemployment of household members or crop
loss.
Table 1.2 provides evidence that enrollment responses to income shocks in Indonesia
are consistent with the perception of sheepskin effects. Column 1 displays the estimation
result of equation (1), which is the basic specification with Last, Shock and an interaction
between the two, ShockxLast. As expected, students whose households experience negative
income shocks are about 2.3 percentage points less likely to be enrolled in school compared
to students whose households do not experience income shocks, indicated by the coefficient
on Shock. Consistent with a belief in sheepskin effects, the estimate for the main coefficient
of interest, ShockxLast is positive and significant. It indicates that among the students
whose households suffer negative income shocks, those in the last grade of a given school
level are about 4.5 percentage points more likely to be enrolled. The adverse impact of
negative income shocks essentially disappears for these students. The positive coefficient on
the control variables ES and JH shows that relative to senior high school –which is the
omitted category– the probability of enrollment is on average highest if the student enters
elementary school and that this probability decreases for higher levels of schooling.
As pointed out earlier, since sheepskin effects reflect the wage value of completion of
an education level, the size of enrollment behavior explained by sheepskin effects could
be different for each education level if its perceived labor market rewards are different.
Therefore, in column 2, I present triple difference results from estimating equation (2) to
examine how human capital investment behavior differs across different education levels.
In column 2, I find evidence consistent with perceived sheepskin effects for enrollment
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decisions in junior and senior high school, but not for elementary school. The omitted
education level category is senior high school. Accordingly, the coefficient on Shock is the
effect of a negative income shock on enrollment in senior high school. The coefficient estimate
indicates that an income shock reduces the probability of enrollment by about 12 percentage
points for students deciding to enter grade levels in senior high school. The coefficients
on ShockxES and ShockxJH estimate the impact of the shock in elementary and junior
high school relative to senior high school, respectively.11 The estimates suggest that the
Shock reduces the enrollment probability in junior high school by about 8 percent, and the
adverse impact of Shock on enrollment is trivial in elementary school. This is consistent
with elementary school being the least costly level to attend and also the opportunity cost
of foregone earnings being lowest, such that near universal enrollment has been achieved at
this level.
Now let’s turn to the main coefficients of interest, which measure the size of the per-
ceived sheepskin effects differentially for each education level, i.e. coefficients on the in-
teraction terms with Last. Senior high school being the omitted category, the coefficient
on ShockxLast captures the effect of perceived sheepskin effect for enrollment decisions in
senior high school. The coefficients on ShockxLastxES and ShockxLastxJH estimate the
impact of a shock in elementary school and junior high relative to that of the senior high
school respectively. The estimates suggest that the magnitude of the perceived sheepskin
effect mitigating enrollment reduction in the presence of a negative shock is largest in senior
high school with 15 percentage points, and about half the size in junior high school, although
the difference is insignificant. On the other hand, the perception of sheepskin effects seems
weakest, or nonexistent at the elementary school level, as the F-test cannot reject that the
11This implies that in order to obtain an estimate for the impact of Shock on enrollment in elementary
school, for example, one should sum the coefficient estimate on the omitted category Shock and ShockxES.
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sum of ShockxLast and ShockxLastxES are equal to zero.
In sum, the results in column 2 imply that human capital investment behavior consistent
with the perception of sheepskin effects is mainly found at higher levels of schooling, which is
junior and senior high school. Since returns to credentials are expected to be larger for junior
and senior high school relative to elementary school as completing higher levels of education
are more valued in the labor market, and skilled occupations in developing countries usually
require more than an elementary school degree, the result seems consistent with labor market
conditions.12
To verify that the positive and significant coefficient on ShockxLast in Table 1.2 is
indeed capturing the underlying differential response to shock in the last grades of junior
and senior high school, I estimate the following equation to better understand heterogeneous
responses to income shocks by each grade:
Enrolliht = α+βShockht +
12∑
j=2
γj1(gradeit = j) +
12∑
j=2
δj1(gradeit = j)∗Shockht +Xiht + εiht
Shockht follows the usual definition. 1(gradeit = j) is a dummy variable that takes a
value of one if the student i will enter grade j in the subsequent school year. The omitted
grade category is grade 2. Therefore, the coefficients on the interaction terms between each
grade dummy and the shock indicator, δjs, should be interpreted as the differential effect of
entering grade j relative to entering grade 2 on enrollment probabilities when the household
experiences negative income shocks. These δjs are of main interest as they indicate the
differential enrollment responsiveness to negative shocks by each grade.
12According to 2011 World bank report on Indonesian labor market, most jobs in the formal sector
require a minimum education level. Even for the relatively simple occupations such as machine operations,
completion of junior high level is expected by the employers. For occupations in craft, sales and clerical
work, most employers expect employees to be educated at or above senior high school level.
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Figure 1.2 displays these coefficients and their 95 percent confidence intervals by each
entering grade. I label δj as grsj in the figure. It provides evidence that the the estimation
results are indeed driven by differential enrollment decision behaviors in the last grade of
each education level in junior and senior high school, marked by jumps in coefficients for
grade 9 and grade 12, labeled as grs9 and grs12.
To reiterate, the Indonesian education system consists of 6 years of elementary school,
3 years of junior high and 3 years of senior high school. Therefore, if parents believe that
sheepskin effects exist in the labor market and adjust human capital investment behavior
accordingly, one expects larger values of grsj for grades 6, 9 and 12 for elementary, junior
high and senior high school, respectively.
In Figure 1.2, I find particularly higher estimates for students entering grades 9 and
12. The figure illustrates education decision patterns that are consistent with a parental
belief in sheepskin effects for junior high school and senior high school. On the other hand,
I observe that grs6 is not statistically different from adjacent years and lower levels of
elementary school in times of shock. This enrollment pattern is inconsistent with perception
of sheepskin effects at the elementary school level, suggesting an absence of anticipation of
sheepskin effects at this level. These estimates are congruous with the findings from triple
interaction regression results found in column 2 of Table 1.2.
It is now clear that the estimates from equation (1) and equation (2) are capturing
the underlying heterogeneous response to income shocks in the last grades of junior and
senior high school, consistent with parental perception of sheepskin effects. One might ask
if this differential pattern by grade could be driven by factors of demand for schooling other
than sheepskin effects, such as selection on ability or outside labor market opportunities
that might differ by grade. However, factors other than sheepskin effects would predict a
monotonic pattern of cross-grade response to shocks. For instance, with selective attrition
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by ability, children’s average ability would increase with grade.13 This implies that students
in grade 10 should be more likely to be enrolled than students entering grade 9 according
to this alternative explanation. However, in fact what I find is a non-monotonicity around
the last grade of junior high, indicated by the differential coefficient of grs9 in Figure 1.2,
which rules out these other demand factors in explaining the observed schooling patterns. I
discuss this in detail in section 5.5.
Altogether, the results so far suggest that the perception of sheepskin effects operates
at the junior and senior high school level.14 Therefore, for the analysis henceforth, I ex-
clude elementary school and focus on human capital investment behavior at the secondary
school level. In addition, to ascertain that the estimation results are driven by sheepskin
effects rather than other demand factors, I further present estimation results restricted to
grade 9 and the adjacent grades before and after grade9 (grades 8 and 10) to verify the
aforementioned non-monotonic relationship.
The schooling responses to income shocks may vary depending on whether the nature of
the income shock is idiosyncratic or systemic; i.e., responses to household members’ unem-
ployment and crop loss might differ. In Table 1.3, I present the result of estimating equation
(1) separately by sources of income shock. Column 1 presents estimates using the previously
defined income shock, which I refer to as combined shock. Columns 2 and 3 separately report
results for unemployment shock and crop loss shock, respectively. The main coefficient of
interest that identifies the differential response to the income shock due to a perception of
a sheepskin effect is always positive, and significant in all columns except column 8. The
13This may occur if students learn about their ability through performance at school and drops out if
the ability they expect to be required at the next grade is higher than their ability. This may generate
differential response to shocks by grade if parents are more likely to protect enrollment for children with
higher ability.
14I continue to find the result of no effect of income shocks on enrollment in elementary school across
other types of income shocks.
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first column of each shock – columns 1, 3 and 5 – presents estimation of equation (1) for
secondary school enrollment decisions and the second column of each shock – columns 2, 4
and 6 – repeats the same estimation restricting to the last grade of junior high school (grade
9) and the adjacent two grades (grades 8 and 10).
Column 1 confirms the findings in the previous analysis, and shows that students in the
households that have suffered either an unemployment shock or crop loss are on average less
likely to transition to the next grade compared to those students who do not experience a
shock. However, the students entering the last grades of junior and senior high school are
not less likely to enroll despite the negative shocks relative to those devoid of shocks. Since
income shocks increase relative cost of enrollment for all grades, the observed enrollment
pattern suggests that households perceive higher returns to education in these grades relative
to other grades. I interpret this as an evidence of a perception of sheepskin effects. The
positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term in column 2 suggests that this
result is explained by perceived sheepskin effects rather than other demand factors such as
selection on ability that induce differential shock responsiveness for those in the last grades
of secondary school.
Column 3 displays the estimation result using the unemployment shock only. It shows
that the direct impact of this shock reduces the likelihood of a student enrolled in a given
school year maintaining enrollment in the subsequent school year by 6.1 percentage points.
However, the adverse impact essentially disappears if the affected student is in the last grades
of secondary school. These students are 8.5 percentage points more likely to enroll relative
to those who suffered a shock and are not in the last grade. In column 4, I find that these
results are robust to restricting the estimation sample to grades before and after the last
grade of junior high school.
I present estimation results using crop loss shock in columns 5 and 6. The schooling
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decision pattern previously observed with the unemployment shock continues to hold. Again,
the shock exerts a negative influence on schooling decisions on average. The coefficient
estimates on the interaction term that captures the differential enrollment response to income
shocks in the last grades are positive and significant in both columns. The size of the
estimates are comparable in magnitude to those using unemployment shock.
1.5.2 Schooling Decisions by Ownership of Buffer Stocks
In this section, I explore how the responses to perceived sheepskin effects differ by own-
ership of buffer stocks. Theoretically, the decisions to maintain enrollment or to dropout
would be independent of income shocks if parents could borrow against future earnings of
their children (Jacoby, 1994). However, when households have borrowing constraints, buffer
stocks provide a medium for self-insurance such that the households can draw down their
assets to generate liquidity in times of income shocks. Intuitively, this suggests that the
direct impact of negative income shocks on enrollment decisions would be larger for house-
holds without buffer stocks because they allow households to smooth consumption. I take
one step further and probe whether the responsiveness of enrollment to income shocks varies
depending on the extent of self-insurance.
I use household savings to proxy for buffer stocks. IFLS solicits the most knowledgeable
household member whether they own any form of savings, which I use to construct a variable
that indicates whether the household has any savings. I estimate equation (1) separately by
ownership of savings and focus on the interaction term to explore how enrollment decisions
reflecting the perception of sheepskin effects might differ across the two groups of households.
One might expect that the shocks induce a larger reduction in enrollment probability for
households without buffer stocks, and the mitigating effect of being in the last grades might
be smaller for these households because they have less means to smooth expenditure relative
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to others with buffer stocks.
Table 1.4 presents the estimation result. For each type of shock, the first column presents
estimation result for households without any savings and the second column shows the result
for households that have savings. Surprisingly, I find that even for the the more financially
vulnerable households, the adverse impact of income shock on enrollment essentially disap-
pears if student enters final grades of junior or senior high school. Specifically, comparing
columns 1 and 2, I find that adverse impact of income shock on likelihood of enrollment is
larger for the more financially vulnerable households, consistent with the expectation that
these households face tighter borrowing constraints.15 Moreover, estimates imply that these
households also exhibit differential response consistent with perception of sheepskin effects
by being more likely to maintain their children’s enrollment in times of shock if they enter
the last grades of secondary school. This suggests that even the poor households find means
to continue investment in education, if they think the returns from doing so are sufficiently
high.
I also repeat the analysis using a broader measure of buffer stocks, which includes owner-
ship of jewelry as an additional form of buffer stocks that could provide liquidity in addition
to savings. I find qualitatively similar results using this definition of buffer stocks.
1.5.3 Rainfall Shocks
Given the importance of agriculture, particularly rice farming in Indonesia, rainfall short-
age is a potential source of negative household income shocks. In this section, I repeat the
empirical analysis using rainfall shocks, constructed from University of Delaware Terrestrial
15The estimates are negative but insignificant, likely because of power issues due to sample size. Also,
measurement error could be present, since savings is an incomplete measure of assets, or buffer stock due to
data limitations.
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Precipitation data. The rainfall measure used to create the rainfall shock variable is post-
onset rainfall – rainfall during the first three months of the monsoon season. The rainfall
shock variable is defined to take a value of one if the post-onset rainfall in a given year falls
into the first decile of the districts’ historical post-onset rainfall distribution. Details were
discussed in section 3.2.
In Table 1.5, I present estimation results using rainfall shocks, first with the full sample
and then focusing on agricultural households in the rural districts. Column 1 shows en-
rollment decisions consistent with perceived sheepskin effects in response to rainfall shocks.
Given that rainfall shocks influence schooling decision through changes in household income,
these shocks may be more relevant for households whose main income source is agriculture.
Therefore, in columns 3-6, I repeat the analysis focusing on rural households whose head’s
primary or secondary occupation is related to agriculture.16
As expected, compared to column 1, coefficient estimates in column 3 display that the
direct effect of the rainfall shock in reducing enrollment is larger and more significant for
agricultural households. The results indicate that for students in rural agricultural house-
holds, rainfall shocks reduce the probability of enrolling in the subsequent school year by 14
percentage points. However, among students affected by the shock, those entering the last
grades of junior and senior high school are 14 percentage points more likely to maintain en-
rollment and hence fully protected from the shock, consistent with previous results. Column
4 shows that this result is robust to restricting to grade 9 and its adjacent grades, despite
the estimates being insignificant due to small sample size.
The aforementioned patterns of human capital investment responses to adverse rainfall
shocks seem more salient for households without savings (columns 5 and 6). The division
of sample suggests that most of the rural agriculture households do not own savings and
16Occupation codes are provided in the IFLS survey at two-digit level.
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hence may be financially vulnerable. Due to the small sample size, the results are only
suggestive, but it is consistent with the previous results that the shock causes larger reduction
in schooling for households without savings but these households find a means to maintain
a child in school when they perceive the returns are sufficiently high, e.g. in the last grades
of junior and senior high school.
1.5.4 Financial Crisis Shocks
In this section, I explore grade progression of Indonesian students using Asian financial
crisis and the panel structure of the IFLS. I show that the timing of the income shock could
have long-term consequences for human capital accumulation; I find that the adverse affect
of a shock induced by financial crisis on grade progression is moderated for children entering
the final grade of a given education level.
The Asian financial crisis hit Indonesia starting at the end of 1997 and worsened during
early 1998. This implies that households whose children were enrolled in 1997/1998 school
year experienced the crisis towards the end of this school year. Some of the households
may have suffered reduction in household income, which would have affected their decision
to enroll their child in the following school years. In particular, Thomas et al. (2004) find
that the financial crisis had more severe impact on the poorer households in Indonesia.
Combined with the information on grade enrolled in 1997/1998 school year, this setting
allows a similar empirical investigation of heterogeneous education investment response with
respect to income shocks, with grade progression as the outcome variable.
I investigate progression of grade levels utilizing the panel structure of the dataset. I
take students who were enrolled in 1997/1998 school year in IFLS 1997 and measure grade
progression by the difference between the completed grade in IFLS 2000 and grade in 1997.
If a student enrolled in 1997/1998 school year follows a normal path of grade progression
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without dropping out, she would obtain two more years of education by 1999/2000 school
year. For example, student in grade 6 in 1997/1998 school year would have completed grade
8 by the end of 1999/2000 school year.
In the previous empirical exercise, I excluded students who completed secondary school-
ing and will enter higher education from the sample. Following the same logic,17 I restrict
my analysis to students who were 10th grade or below in 1997/1998 school year for the
estimation, i.e. students who would have not entered higher education by 1999/2000 school
year.18 I further restrict my sample to students who are not in elementary school, as earlier
findings suggest that both the direct impact of the negative shock and the differential edu-
cation decision from perception of sheepskin effect are negligible at that level. The finalized
sample consists of students who were enrolled between grade 6 and grade 10 in 1997/1998
school year.
This data construction narrows the focus to differential investment associated with the
perceived sheepskin effects for the completion of junior high school only, since students
entering grade 12 would be excluded from the sample. This is similar to previous empirical
exercises focusing on the adjacent grades of the last grade of junior high school.
If the perception of sheepskin effects matters for schooling decisions, it would mitigate
the negative impact of the crisis on grade progression for students entering the last year of
junior high school (grade 9) after the crisis. Hence I set the indicator variable Last equal to
one for these students. To define the income shock resulting from the financial crisis, I use
17I exclude college students from the sample as Indonesian higher education consists of various institutions
that take anywhere from 1 to 4 or more years to complete, which makes it difficult to determine which students
are facing the final grade before completion. See Data section for details.
18A student in grade 11 in 1997/1998 school year, would have finished secondary education and moved
on to either college or the labor market by 1999/2000 school year. Therefore, these students are excluded
from the sample. Details for normal grade progression for students enrolled in 1997/1998 school year is
summarized in Appendix Table A.2.
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the findings from Thomas et al. (2004) that poorer households suffered the most from the
crisis. Therefore, I define Shock to indicate households that are located in the bottom pth
percentile of the income distribution in 1997 using real log per capita income as a measure
of pre-crisis household income.19 I let p take values of 5, 10 and 25.
Table 1.6 displays regression results for 3 different definitions of income shock on number
of grades progressed. The estimates confirm that the direct impact of the shock was largest
for the poorest households. The coefficient estimate on Shock is largest for the bottom 5th
percentile shock and decreases henceforth. Comparing across the three columns, the shock
variable is only significant for the bottom 5 or 10 percentile shock and not for the 25th
percentile shock. This implies that the reduction in education from experiencing the crisis
pertained to households in lower than 25 percentile of the income distribution and the effect
dampens as income percentiles increase. Column 1 shows that the students in the bottom 5
percentile households progressed less by slightly less than half a year.
Most important are the positive and significant estimates on the coefficients of interest,
ShockxLast. The results show that students entering grade 9 attain little less than half a
year more, relative to students who suffered income shock but entering other grades; i.e.
grade progression is less hindered for students entering the the final grade of junior high
school after the financial crisis. The sample construction does not allow analysis for the
last grade of senior high school, but this differential response for grade 9 is consistent with
household responding to sheepskin effects as found in previous sections. The underlying
differential response to financial crisis shock by grade is indeed driven by enrollment being
less sensitive to shocks in grade 9, illustrated in appendix Figure A.2.
19The household income measure I use is pre-crisis (IFLS 1997) log per capita expenditure because the
households’ rankings in the income distribution might have shifted as a result of the crisis. This implies that
IFLS 2000 per capita expenditure may be less informative about financial vulnerability at the time of the
crisis. See Negative Income Shock Construction section for details.
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These findings suggest that while income shocks could have a lasting effect on human
capital accumulation, the students who expect to enter the final grade of an education level
after the income shock are relatively more fortunate as grade progression is less obstructed
for these students. This relates to the literature that the timing of shocks during childhood
having long-term consequences throughout life cycle (Almond and Currie, 2011), and sug-
gests that timing of an adverse shock not only matters for only early childhood but also for
early adolescent period as well.
In addition, in the particular context of financial crisis or recessions, my findings imply
that students who suffer shock in non-sheepskin grades, have higher likelihood of entering the
labor market in the aftermath of the crisis as their education investment is less protected than
those entering the last grades of secondary school. According to Oreopoulos, von Wachter,
and Heisz (2012a), because initial labor market experience has a long term effect on lifetime
earnings, individuals entering the labor market for the first time during the recession suffer
from persistently lower wages. Combined, this implies that the impact of the timing of
an income shock on lifetime earnings may be amplified during periods of bad labor market
through two channels: first, by deterred schooling investment and second, reinforced by lower
starting wage in the labor market.
1.5.5 Alternative Explanations
Could the pattern of differential response to income shocks for students entering the last
grades of junior and senior high school be driven by demand side explanations other than
the perception of sheepskin effects? In this section, I address two potential factors that
could generate enrollment responses that vary by grade: selection on ability and outside
opportunities in the labor market.
First possibility is selection on ability. If higher grade levels require higher ability, or
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if students learn about their ability through schooling, students with the lowest ability will
not transition to the next grade, i.e. average ability is increasing in grade. If parents are
more likely to maintain enrollment for children with more ability, this raises a concern that
the smaller likelihood of dropping out in response to income shocks found in the last grades
of junior and senior high school, may be explained by higher average ability in these grades
relative to other grades. In this case, I should find income shocks to be less likely to reduce
enrollment, the higher the grade level. To measure students ability, in appendix Figure
A.3, I present household heads’ completed education for each grade as a proxy for students’
ability.20 It shows that household head’s education level monotonically increases with grade.
However, my results exhibit non-monotonic relationship in the last grade of junior high
level, which rules out ability as an alternative story for the observed findings. Specifically,
students entering the last grade of junior high (grade 9) are less likely to drop out relative to
the penultimate grade of junior high (grade 8) as well as first grade of senior high (grade 10)
when an income shock occurs. If the ability story holds, since the average ability would be
higher for students entering the first grade of senior high school, enrollment should be less
sensitive to shocks for the first grade of senior high than last grade of junior high; This is
not what I see in the data as presented in Figure 1.2 , which rules out selection in explaining
smaller drop in enrollment in the last grades of junior and senior high school in response to
negative shocks.
Another factor that could generate variations in returns to schooling by grade is differ-
ences in outside opportunities. The return to an additional year of schooling is lower if the
opportunity cost of schooling is higher that year. Therefore, if the labor market values phys-
ical strength, or years of schooling, the average foregone earnings would increase by grade.
20Household heads’ education level is used as a proxy for students’ ability because it is highly predictive
of their enrollment status and is also available for all sample.
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This implies that responsiveness of enrollment to income shocks should monotonically in-
crease by grade, which is also inconsistent with the pattern I observe in current analysis. As
a result, the pattern of heterogeneous responses to income shocks that I find in Indonesian
data rules out the alternative explanations, and provides evidence of sheepskin effects as the
main mechanism.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper is the first paper to explore the impact of perception of sheepskin effects in
a human capital investment context, which has important implications for human capital
accumulation in developing countries, particularly when income is volatile.
I argue that demand for education influences human capital accumulation decision in
Indonesia. Particularly, in the presence of a perception of sheepskin effects –additional wage
premium associated with completion of an education level– the demand for an extra year
of schooling varies depending on whether the student will finish an education level with the
additional year of schooling. I test my hypothesis using negative income shocks to isolate the
effect of perceived returns to education and analyze the cross-grade variation in enrollment
responses to these shocks.
I find that negative household income shocks reduce the probability of children advancing
to the next grade level on average, consistent with previous literature on credit constraints
and limited consumption smoothing in developing countries. Moreover, I find heterogenous
response to negative income shocks by grade level, consistent with a perception of sheepskin
effects. Specifically, I find that this adverse impact of income shocks on schooling investment
is reduced for students who enter the last grades of junior and senior high school. This finding
is robust across various types of income shocks, ranging from idiosyncratic unemployment
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shocks to systemic shocks including crop loss, rainfall shocks and the Asian financial crisis.
Particularly surprising is that even poor households, which may be more credit constrained
due to a lack of sufficient buffer stocks, exhibit a similar schooling behavior of protecting
education investment for children in the last grades of secondary school. This implies that
even the poor find means to maintain their children in school, when they think the returns
are sufficiently high.
Overall, my findings shed light on the underlying demand factor for schooling decisions,
particularly transition decisions. The evidence of differential responsiveness to negative
income shocks suggests that the timing of negative income shocks may matter in terms
of human capital accumulation in developing countries. Previous research has discussed
that timing of shocks matter in utero or in early childhood (Almond and Currie, 2011). In
addition, the results I find suggest that the timing of shock during early adolescence may
also have long term consequences. The goal of developing countries’ education is to increase
the stock of human capital, which is beneficial for individuals as well as the economy as the
stock of skilled labor increases. Yet, still many countries face stagnation in attained years of
schooling beyond primary or compulsory level. The observed schooling decisions at the lower
and upper secondary education level in the current study suggests that further explorations of
the actual size of sheepskin effects in the labor market, the corresponding schooling response
and their implications on education policies would be an interesting direction for future
research.
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Head less than elementary school 0.19 0.39
Head elementary school 0.47 0.50
Head junior high school 0.13 0.33
Head senior high school 0.16 0.36
Head college or more 0.06 0.23
Own home 0.85 0.36
Own savings 0.28 0.45
Use electricity 0.89 0.31
Head engaged in agriculture 0.33 0.47
Unemployment shock 0.01 0.12
Crop loss shock 0.03 0.17
Rainfall shock 0.06 0.24
N 12941
Notes:
1. This table presents summary statistics for variable used in the analysis. Means and standard deviations are presented for
each variable.
2. I define buffer stock to be assets that could immediately generate liquidity for the household; e.g. households that declare
their ownership of savings are defined as households with buffer stocks.
3. Household head is defined to be engaged in agriculture if head’s primary or secondary occupation is in the agriculture
category.
4. Households experience an unemployment shock if household members becomes unemployed. Rainfall shock occurs if
rainfall falls in the first decile of the district’s usual rainfall distribution, using measure of rainfall during the first 3 months of
the monsoon season.
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Table 1.2: Effect of Income Shocks on Probability of Enrollment

























District FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Notes:
1. This table tests whether households make differential enrollment decisions in response to income shocks when children are
entering the last grade of a given education level, capturing the perception of sheepskin effects.
2. Perception of sheepskin effects is captured by the coefficient on ShockxLast
3. Dependent variable is probability of enrollment in the subsequent school year conditional on enrollment in a given year
(Transition probability, or conditional enrollment).
4. Shock variable takes a value of one if household experiences either unemployment of household member or crop loss in a
given year. The variable Last indicates whether the student will enter the last grade of an education level. Last takes a value
of one if the student faces enrollment decisions of entering grade 6 for elementary, grade 9 for junior high and grade 12 for
senior high school.
5. Each regression includes year and district fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at household level. Controls include
indicator for female, urban/rural residence and household head’s education level.
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Table 1.3: Effect of Income Shocks on Probability of Enrollment
Dependent Variable: Probability of Enrollment
Shock Type Combined Shock Unemployment Crop Loss
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Last 0.0286*** -0.0039 0.0311*** 0.0006 0.0300*** -0.0016
(0.0055) (0.0089) (0.0055) (0.0086) (0.0055) (0.0089)
Shock -0.0386* -0.0943*** -0.0613* -0.1036* -0.0233 -0.0808*
(0.0215) (0.0356) (0.0366) (0.0603) (0.0259) (0.0424)
ShockxLast 0.0883*** 0.1347*** 0.0851** 0.1151* 0.0847*** 0.1332***
(0.0234) (0.0380) (0.0384) (0.0616) (0.0284) (0.0459)
N 6,199 3,119 6,195 3,118 6,198 3,118
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes:
1. This table tests separately for each shock type whether households make differential enrollment decisions in response to
income shocks when children are entering the last grade of a given education level
2. Dependent variable is probability of enrollment in the subsequent school year conditional on enrollment in a given year
(Transition probability, or conditional enrollment).
3. Columns (1), (3), (5) look at enrollment for secondary school sample. Columns (2), (4), (6) restrict the sample to grades
before and after the last grade of junior high school, grades 8, 9 and 10.
4. Shock variable takes a value of one if households experience negative income shocks in a given year. Combined shock takes
a value of one if either unemployment or crop loss shock occurs. The variable Last indicates whether the student will enter
the last grade of an education level.
5. Each regression includes year and district fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at household level. Controls include
indicator for female, urban/rural residence and household head’s education level.
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Table 1.4: Effect of Income Shocks on Probability of Enrollment: Buffer Stocks
Dependent Variable: Probability of Enrollment
Combined Shock Unemployment Crop Loss
No Savings Has Savings No Savings Has Savings No Savings Has Savings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Last 0.0316*** 0.0181** 0.0354*** 0.0172** 0.0333*** 0.0194***
(0.00727) (0.00746) (0.00713) (0.00728) (0.00722) (0.00745)
Shock -0.0433* -0.0183 -0.0502 -0.0686 -0.0367 0.0345*
(0.0261) (0.0309) (0.0459) (0.0531) (0.0313) (0.0178)
ShockxLast 0.105*** 0.0205 0.0983* 0.0784 0.101*** -0.0324
(0.0289) (0.0294) (0.0510) (0.0545) (0.0340) (0.0204)
Observations 4,331 1,868 4,327 1,868 4,330 1,868
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes:
1. This table tests whether households make differential enrollment decisions in response to income shocks when children are
entering the last grade of a given education level, separately by buffer stocks ownership.
2. Ownership of buffer stocks is defined as whether or not the household holds any savings.
3. Dependent variable is probability of enrollment in the subsequent school year conditional on enrollment in a given year
(Transition probability, or conditional enrollment).
4. Shock variable takes a value of one if households experience income shocks in a given year. The variable Last indicates
whether the student will enter the last grade of an education level.
5. Each regression includes year and district fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at household level. Controls include
indicator for female, urban/rural residence and household head’s education level.
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Table 1.5: Effect of Rainfall Shocks on Probability of Enrollment
Dependent Variable: Probability of Enrollment
All Households Agricultural Households
No Savings Has Savings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Last 0.0288*** -0.0000 0.0569*** 0.0074 0.0536*** 0.0761*
(0.0056) (0.0088) (0.0123) (0.0156) (0.0131) (0.0402)
Shock -0.0270 -0.0131 -0.1415** -0.1287 -0.1846** 0.0623
(0.0282) (0.0449) (0.0851) (0.1504) (0.0971) (0.0619)
ShockXLast 0.0425** 0.0206 0.1492** 0.1024 0.2036** -0.0956
(0.0184) (0.0401) (0.0635) (0.1187) (0.0807) (0.0695)
N 6,199 3,119 1,543 802 1,279 264
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes:
1. This table tests whether households make differential enrollment decisions in response to rainfall shocks when children are
entering the last grade of a given education level
2. Dependent variable is probability of enrollment in the subsequent school year conditional on enrollment in a given year
(Transition probability, or conditional enrollment).
3. Columns (1) and (3) look at enrollment for secondary school sample. Columns (2) and (4) restrict the sample to grades
before and after the last grade of junior high school, grades 8, 9 and 10.
4. Rainfall shock is defined to indicate rainfall falling in the first decile of historical district level rainfall. The variable Last
indicates whether the student will enter the last grade of an education level.
5. Each regression includes year and district fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at district year level. Controls include
indicator for female, urban/rural residence and household head’s education level, usage of electricity, home ownership and
buffer stock ownership.
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Table 1.6: Grade Progression after Asian Financial Crisis




Last -0.0005 -0.0057 0.0065
(0.0311) (0.0316) (0.0334)
Shock -0.3593*** -0.1885** -0.0437
(0.1357) (0.0911) (0.0430)
ShockxLast 0.4372* 0.3608*** 0.0003
(0.2253) (0.1304) (0.0943)
N 1,564 1,564 1,564
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes:
1.This table tests whether households make differential grade progression decisions in response to crisis-led income shocks
when children are entering the last grade of junior high school.
2. Dependent variable is number of grades progressed.
3. I define Shock to indicate households that is located are the bottom pth percentile of the income distribution in 1997 using
real log per capita income as a measure of pre-crisis household income, following the findings from Thomas et el. (2004). p
takes value of 5, 10 and 25 respectively for columns 1, 2 and 3.
4. Each regression includes year and district fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at household level. Controls include
indicator for female, urban/rural residence and household head’s education level.
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Figure 1.1: Grade Transition Pattern in the Cross Section
Notes:
1. This figure illustrates the grade transition pattern of the sample in the cross section.
2. Each point on the graph denotes the enrollment probability of students entering the given grade conditional on enrollment
in the previous grade. For instance, the plotted point for grade 6 is the conditional probability of student enrolling in grade 6
conditional on completing grade 5.
3. Vertical red lines separate the three education levels of focus; elementary school (grades 1-6), junior high school (grades
7-9) and senior high school (grades 10-12).
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Figure 1.2: Differential Responses to Negative Income Shocks by Grade
Notes:
1. This figure illustrates the differential enrollment response to negative income shocks by each grade.
2. Grade 6 is the last grade of elementary school. Grade 9 and grade 12 refer to the last grades of junior and senior high
school, respectively.
3. This figure plots the coefficients on the interaction terms of shock and grade dummies from the following equation, δj ,
labeled as grsj for each grade j and the corresponding 95% confidence intervals :
Enrolliht = α+ βShockht +
∑12
j=2 γj1(gradeit = j) +
∑12
j=2 δj1(gradeit = j) ∗ Shockht +Xiht + εiht
4. Enrolliht is probability of enrollment in the subsequent school year conditional on enrollment in a given year.
1(gradeit = j) is a dummy for students entering grade j. Omitted grade category is grade 2.
5. Standard errors are clustered at the household level.
Chapter 2
Impact of Higher Education on Labor





The past couple of decades have seen rapid increases in higher education enrollments. The
pace of growth varies considerably across countries, with relatively little growth in countries
like the United States and Israel, where higher education attainment was already quite high
in the late 1990s: in contrast, historically low attainment countries such as South Korea,
Belgium and France have experienced more than a 40% point increase in higher education
attainment.1
Despite the salience of these trends, there is only a limited understanding of the causal
impact of this expansion, in part because it is difficult to observe exogenous variation in col-
lege enrollment. Most examples of exogenous variation in education come from institutional
changes such as compulsory education or minimum school leaving age which allow one to
examine returns to primary education or secondary education (Acemoglu and Angrist, 2000;
Oreopoulos, 2006; Angrist and Krueger, 1991). Due to the lack of exogenous institutional
variation in higher education, studies of the returns to college education have been limited.
Currie and Moretti (2003) uses new college openings to identify the impact of mother’s col-
lege education on children health. Card (1993) uses proximity to college as instrument to
study the impact on earnings. However, it is hard to completely rule out that both college
and residential location are endogenous.
In this paper, we address this empirical challenge by providing an arguably causal esti-
mate of the impact of college education on labor market outcomes using a natural experiment
in South Korea. The education reform of July 1980 discretely increased the opportunity for
college education by increasing the college freshman quota, the centrally mandated size of
1Source: OECD report of Education at a Glance 2011.OECD report have redefined tertiary education
category to make international comparison possible hence the definition of tertiary education in this report
could be different from what we define as higher education or college education in the sections that follow.
Figure B.1 graphically illustrates the trend in tertiary education.
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the freshman entering class. This policy change resulted in a large increase in the pro-
portion of individuals with some college education for cohorts born on or after 1962. We
exploit this sharp difference in the proportion of population with college education across
adjacent cohorts to apply a regression discontinuity design to identify the causal effect of
higher education.
In addition to labor market outcomes, we present the first causal evidence on the impact
of college education on household savings, which has been not previously studied in the
literature. Impact on saving behavior is particularly interesting because it has implications
for both private and public returns to higher education.
We find that college education improves labor market outcomes of individuals by in-
creasing the probability of being employed and increasing labor earnings. Moreover, we find
that the college education affects the occupational choice of the workers: individuals who
obtained college education are less likely to become blue-collar workers. As a final labor
market outcome, we use the particular experience of South Korea to further explore how
college education affected job attachment during the Asian Financial Crisis. We find that
workers with college education were 13 percentage points less likely to lose jobs during the
crisis. In other words, college education induces better labor market prospects through two
main mechanisms: increasing the level of income and at the same time reducing the volatility
of income.
Next, we find positive impact of college education on two measures of household savings:
likelihood to save at the household level and the amount of household savings. Our estimates
indicate that having a household head with some college education increases the amount of
household savings by 20 percent. This implies that the increase in earnings is not fully
offset by an increase in consumption, but rather some of the increased earnings translate
into positive savings, thereby increasing the amount of loanable funds in the economy.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the background of
the policy in Korea. Section 3 provides an overview of the main data, KLIPS. Section 4
presents the empirical strategy, and Section 5 presents the main empirical results. Section 6
concludes.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Education reform of 1980
Unlike other countries, the number of freshman admitted by colleges—the freshman
quota—was controlled by the government in South Korea. The admission guidelines for
both private and public colleges were centrally controlled, hence the freshman quota was
applied to all types of colleges nationally. The freshman quota was strictly administered and
was subject to a sizable noncompliance penalty including a loss of the government funding
and/or subsidy and a reduction in freshmen quota the following year.
The supply of higher education institution was regulated centrally as well. Establishing a
new college required government permission, and the government kept the number of colleges
more or less stable during our period of interest.2 These two restrictions rendered the supply
of college graduates exogenous to the demand for college education and returns to college
education. Despite the rising demand for college education, the government adjusted the of
entrance quota only to a limited extent. This resulted in a large increase of the number of
‘retakers’ who took the college entrance exam and applied for college more than once.3
2The government eventually made the restriction for establishing new college less strict in 1996
3In Korea, college entrance exam is held once a year at the end of the school year, so retakers were those
whose exam results were unsatisfactory, or those couldn’t get into the school they wanted and decided to
wait until the next year to take the entrance exam again. There are no limits to how many number of college
entrance exams they could retake. Students graduate after they finish their 3rd grade of high school, hence
45
The freshman entrance quota was replaced by a graduation quota by the education reform
of July 30, 1980. This change was completely unexpected as it was a strategic action by
a military junta to gain political popularity. The reform quickly followed the formation of
military junta by coup d’ètat of December, 1979 subsequent to President Park Chung-hee’s
assination on October 1979. The main objectives of the reform were to reduce the pool
of retakers, increase quality of college graduates through competition during college, and
expand higher education opportunities to the disadvantaged population.
The details of the reform are as follows. Prior to the reform, the supply of college
graduates were set using the freshman quota. After the reform, a graduation quota was
set, stipulating the number of individuals that would be allowed to graduate. The freshman
quota was calculated to correspond to 130% of the graduation quota. The reform stated that
30% of the admitted students would be discharged before graduation based on performance.
However, the discharge of students was not adhered to in practice. The government
made discharge discretionary in 1983 so virtually none of the freshman affected by the
1980 education reform faced the possibility of dismissal.4 The graduation quota system was
abolished in 1988 and the government returned to freshman quota as a single medium to
regulate the supply of college graduates. As a result, the 1980 education reform effectively
increased the number of college graduates for the cohort affected by the reform. The resulting
sizable increase in the freshman quota is presented in Figure 2.1.
retakers are either high school graduates or G.E.D holders
4The government later allowed the student who was already discharged to reentered the school and finish
his/her college degree
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2.2.2 The Education System in South Korea
The education system in South Korea consists of 6 years of elementary school, 3 years of
middle school, 3 years of high school, and 2 or 4 years of college. The school year corresponds
closely with the calendar year so the first semester is March to June and the second semester
is September to December. An individual who is 7 years old as of March is mandated to
enter elementary school. Elementary school became compulsory in 1952 and middle school
became compulsory in 1998.
In this paper we utilize the fact that the first cohort that was affected by this reform is
the cohort that took the entrance exam in December 1980. A single college entrance exam is
administered at the end of each year and only students who completed 3 years of high school
or the equivalent5 can take the exam. Hence the cohort first affected by the reform is the
cohort born in 1962, since these are the individuals who are high school seniors in December
1980. Due to the discrete increase of freshman quota in 1980, we expect a discrete jump
in the fraction of college educated individuals at the birth year of 1962. This exogenous
discontinuity is our source of identification.
2.3 Data
To exploit the exogenous education reform and related variation in higher education at-
tainment across cohorts, this paper uses the Korean Labor and Income Panel Study(KLIPS).6
KLIPS is similar to PSID in the U.S. as the data tracks the household and has information
at both the household and the individual level for household members. The data is collected
5Passage of the South Korean equivalent of G.E.D, Gumjeong gosi
6Using Korean Census is not a viable option as the data does not contain information about the earnings
of the individuals. More importantly, it does not contain information about the predetermined characteristics
of the individuals which is used to identify the disadvantaged population.
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by the Korean Labor Institute to provide information about labor market outcomes. It is
an annual panel of roughly 4,248-5,116 households and 11,541-13,321 individuals per wave,
and contains detailed demographic information, such as birth year, gender, location of the
residence at 14 and educational attainment. It also contains labor market variables such as
wage and occupation. The first wave of KLIPS corresponds to 1998 and each year thereafter.
Hence the cohorts who are affected by the policy are between mid 30s to mid 40s in our data
set. Thus, the data allow researchers to examine the effect of the higher education on labor
market outcomes when the individuals are at the prime of their career. For the empirical
analysis, we pool eleven waves—first through eleven—which was collected from 1998 to 2008.
As the reform was mainly targeted to the disadvantaged population, we limit our sample
to the population that initially had low college education attainment and hence are likely
to be largely affected by the education reform. In particular, we exclude individuals whose
father’s education level is beyond high school graduate and whose location of residence at
age 14 is in Seoul Metropolitan area and 6 Metropolitan cities.7 We exclude the urban areas
since the higher education attainment was already relatively high in those areas prior to
the reform. Figure 2.2 shows the level and trend in the proportion of the individuals with
some college education for our sample and non-sample area. The figure shows that prior to
1962, the fraction of individuals with college education was much higher in the non-sample
area than our sample area, despite having a similar trend. Moreover, we focus on the male
population to avoid complications related to labor market participation decisions by female
individuals. Finally, we focus limit the window of the main analysis to those whose birth
year is within 20 years before and after 1962.8
7The six metropolitan cities are: Busan, Daegu, Daejeon, Incheon, Gwangju and Ulsan
8We also use the 30 year window which is used in Oreopoulos (2006). The result for using 30 year window
is qualitatively similar with the main result.
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Using this sample, we examine the causal effect of higher education on labor market
outcomes and household savings outcomes. We use measures of individual earnings such as
monthly wage and income to investigate monetary returns to college education. In particular,
we examine the monetary return from higher education for both salary workers self-employed
workers and employed workers. In addition to monetary returns to education, we explore the
effect of higher education on employment and occupational choice of the workers. To perform
these analyses, we examine whether the individual is a blue-collar worker. In particular, using
International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) 88 code, we define blue-collar
jobs if the ISCO code is equal to 7 (craft and related workers) or 8 (Plant and machine
operators and assemblers). The last empirical analysis on labor market returns to college
education addresses whether individuals with higher education were more able to weather
through the Asian financial crisis with a job. We focus on workers who were employed prior
to the 1997 crisis, with year 1996 as the base year. Using 11th wave KLIPS supplement data,
we examine whether higher education had on impact on the likelihood that they lost their
job during the crisis. It contains retrospective employment history and current employment
records of individuals collected since the first wave in 1998 (which was surveyed toward the
end of the financial crisis).9 The data contains information for each employment incidence;
starting year and month, ending year and month (if it has ended), the job type (salary worker
or self employment). We construct a binary variable for job loss during crisis if the year of
unemployment is either 1997 or 1998.
Next, we turn to explore the causal effect of higher education on household saving be-
9When new individuals were added to the panel in future waves, they would also be asked their retro-
spective work history and current occupation. Note, as interviewee’s entrant wave is further away from the
first wave, the years included in retrospective working history is longer. For example,while for individuals
first interviewed in 1999 (second wave), employment in 1998 would be a retrospective entry and employment
in 1999 is current employment, for individuals interviewed in 2000, both 1999 and 1998 employment is ret-
rospective entry. The questions asked for the retrospective and current employment is exactly the same, but
coded to note that some are retrospective information and others are not.
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havior. The KLIPS questionnaire asks the most knowledgeable household member “What
is your average monthly savings?” the answer of which we use to construct the savings vari-
able.10 We construct two variables; an indicator for having a positive monthly savings and
a variable for amount of monthly savings. The categories for forms of savings are: i) regular
checking/savings account ii) private pension iii) accident or injury insurance iv) life insurance
v) mutual fund vi) saving insurance vii) rotating savings and credit associations.11 Majority
of household savings fall into the category of i) or iii). KLIPS also collects information on
what households are saving for. In the order of prevalence, some of the answers are the
following: provision against accident or disease, educational expenses for children, preparing
for old age and saving for housing. We further examine whether households with higher
education are likely to save a higher proportion of their income, by analyzing saving rates.
We define saving rate as monthly savings over monthly household labor income.12
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics separately for cohorts who are born prior to 1962
and born on or after 1962. Overall, the cohorts who are born after 1962 have better educa-
tional outcome as Korea has been rapidly developed during this period. The first and second
row shows the proportion of the individuals with some college education and college degree
or more, respectively. Around 12 percent of the individuals who were born prior to the 1962
experienced college education, whereas around 30 percent of the individuals in the latter
cohorts obtained at least some college education. There is little difference in the probability
10This is a self-reported variable hence there maybe room for subjective interpretation of “savings” for
each individual.
11KLIPS collected category of savings from waves 4 and on, but not for waves 1-3. Households are able
to choose multiple categories.
12This variable is collected since wave 4. We use this labor income as at the main denominator to be
consistent with monthly measure of savings. Alternative denominators include household’s yearly labor in-
come; for this denominator, we multiply savings by 12 months assuming regular monthly savings to construct
household saving rate. Another denominator is household head’s monthly labor income.
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of being employed for the younger and older cohorts, whereas the younger cohorts are much
more likely to become salary workers. However, conditional on being salary workers, there is
little difference on being full time workers. Also, the younger cohorts are slightly less like to
become blue-collar workers and slightly more likely to become service sector workers. Among
salary workers, older cohorts have slightly higher monthly wage, however, for self employed
workers younger cohorts are more likely to have positive income and higher monthly income.
2.4 Empirical Strategy
The 1980 education reform presents an opportunity to evaluate the impact of college
education using a regression discontinuity design by comparing individuals born before and
after 1962. The RD design relies on the idea that individuals born just before 1962 serve as
a good control group for those born right after 1962. The running variable for the analysis
is birth year as implied by the rules of the reform.
The underlying assumption is that college education and the outcome variables of interest
are a smooth function of birth year in the absence of the education reform. For the first stage
to be valid, we assume that unobservable characteristics such as the preference for college
education and ability are smooth in birth year. To justify our assumption we show that
observable characteristics that may be correlated with college education are smooth in the
running variable. In particular, we show that father’s education level is smooth around the
birth year of 1962. Figure 2.3 present the proportion of individuals whose father’s education
level is more than middle school.
Sorting is not a concern in our setting since the parents of the sample individuals could
not have foreseen this reform of 1980 when planning birth. Figure 2.4 describes the density
of the running variable. One can verify that there is little evidence of sorting across birth
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cohorts around 1962.
Our discontinuity is not sharp but fuzzy in birth year due to three reasons: i) not everyone
desires to go to college ii) not everyone who desires is able to enter and iii) the existence of
retakers.13 As we mentioned earlier, some of the students born prior to 1962 but re-taking
the exam in 1980 and afterwards would also be affected by this reform. Thus we use the
dummy variable for being born in or after 1962 as an instrument for college education. The
first stage regression is as follows:
Collegei = δ0 + δ1Treati + f(birthyeari) + εi (2.1)
Collegei is a dummy variable for whether individual i has some college education. f(birthyeari)
is a flexible function of birth year centered at 1962. We use a linear spline which allows the
effect to vary on either side of the cutoff. εi is an error term clustered on birth year. Treati
is a binary variable that indicates whether the individual was affected by the 1980 education
reform. This variable is defined as:
Treati = {
1 if birthyeari ≥ 1962
0 if birthyeari < 1962
Basically, this regression discontinuity design compares the outcome of cohorts affected
by the education reform of 1980 to the cohorts born too early to be affected. The main
coefficient δ1 estimates first stage relationship between being born after 1962, and thus
being affected by the policy, and receiving some college education.
The reduced form effect estimation is as follows:
13Being born after 1961 does not correspond directly to having some college education.
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Yib = β0 + β1Treati + f(birthyeari) + εi (2.2)
The coefficient β1 is our intent-to-treat effect of interest. The calculation of treatment





Before documenting the reduced form effect of higher education on various labor mar-
ket outcomes, we first confirm the effect of the education reform on the higher education
attainment of disadvantaged population. Figure 2.5 illustrates the proportion of individuals
with at least some college education and with college degree or more across birth cohorts.
Each panel demonstrates a discrete increase in the fraction of individuals with some college
education and with college degree or more at the birth year cutoff. In particular, prior to
1962, the fraction of individuals with some college education was stable around 13% point on
average for the cohorts in our sample born prior to 1962. However, the proportion jumps to
about 23% for the cohorts who were born in 1962 and thus initially affected by the education
reform. The pattern is similar for the proportion of the individuals with a college degree or
more. In particular, the proportion is stable at around 10% for the cohort who were born
prior to the birth year cutoff, however, jumps discretely to about 21% for the cohorts born
at 1962.
This graphical illustration is supported by the regression result presented in Table 2.2.
The table summarizes the result for estimating equation (1) in the previous section for various
specifications. Column (1)-(3) and Column (4)-(6) reports the regression result for having
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some college education or more and having college degree or more as an outcome variable,
respectively. Column (1) and (4) reports the estimation result with no additional controls
other than the linear spline. Column (2) and (5) adds dummy variables indicating current
location of residence and year fixed effects. Additional to the control use in the Column
(2) and Column (5), Column(3) and Column(6) controls for predetermined characteristics
of individuals such as father’s education attainment, place of birth and location of residence
at age 14.
The regression result confirms a strong first stage which coincides with the graphical
illustrations. Specifically, the coefficient of the binary treatment variable, treat is highly
significant across various specifications: a strong first stage. It shows that individuals born
after 1962 are 10% points more likely to have at least some college education. Also, they
are 9% point more likely to obtain college degree or more compare to slightly older cohorts.
Both set of result shows that the cohorts who started to face a larger opportunity for college
education induced by the education reform, have higher fraction of individuals with college
education attainment.
2.5.2 Labor Market Outcomes
Wages and Income
For the next four subsections, we study the reduced form impact of college education on
labor market outcomes. We begin by examining the effect of higher education on the mone-
tary returns. In particular, we explore the monetary returns to higher education separately
for salary workers and self employed workers on their wage and income.
By regressing equation (2) using log of monthly wage as an outcome variable, we find
a strong evidence on the positive monetary return of higher education for salary workers.
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Column (4)-(6) of Table 2.3 summarizes the regression result. There is sizable and signifi-
cant increase in monthly wage for the cohort who experienced a discrete increase in higher
education attainment. In particular, we find that log monthly wage increases by 9-12% for
the cohort at the birth year cutoff. Moreover, the estimation is statistically significant and
robust across different specifications. The regression result is consistent with graphical evi-
dence which is summarized in Figure 2.6. Panel A plots means of residuals from a regression
of the dependent variable on year fixed effects, age and age squared. Panel B plots residuals
from regression which additionally controls for variables such as father’s education, residence
at age 14 and current location of residence and place of birth. The fitted linear trend for each
side of the birth cohort cutoff is superimposed onto the graph. Both panel demonstrates the
discrete increase in the average log monthly wage at the birth year cutoff.
We confirm this positive impact of higher education on wage earnings by illustrating the
lifetime wage profile of wage workers born before and after 1962. Figure 2.7 displays lifetime
wage profiles for cohorts born between 1959 and 1964. The treatment effect is clear: there
exists a sizable gap between the wage profile of workers born in 1961 and 1962 compared to
the wage profile gap between other adjacent cohorts, which are more closely aligned.14
One interesting pattern is that despite the fact that the proportion of individuals with
at least some college education continued to increase after 1962 as in Figure 2.5, the wage
pattern in Figure 2.6 displays a discrete jump at 1962 and a non-increasing slope thereafter.
One possible explanation is that this results from a combination of the effect of decreasing
14In appendix FigureB.3, we provide a falsification test as an additional piece of evidence for positive
impact of college education on labor income. We compare wage profiles of disadvantaged individuals who
are included in our empirical analysis to those of advantaged individuals – individuals with father with some
college education or more or living in the metropolitan areas at age 14 – who were not included in the analysis
, but in KLIPS dataset. Panel A displays the wage profile for our sample, the disadvantaged sample, which
displays a discrete increase in the lifetime profile between workers born in 1961 and 1962. On the other
hand, Panel B, plotted using the advantaged individuals displays the absence of gap between workers born
in 1961 and 1962.
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wage premium for college graduates as the supply of college graduates increased and the
effect of 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. The literature documents some evidence that initial
labor market conditions have lasting effects on earnings and labor market outcomes of college
graduates (Kahn, 2010; Oreopoulos et al., 2012b). Since the Asian financial crisis occurred
at the end of 1997, the 1962 cohort was about age 34 and already in the labor market when
the crisis had hit, but later cohorts experienced the crisis when they were just entering the
labor market. Hence wage contracts were likely to be unfavorable to these later cohorts.
The effect of higher education on monetary return is similar for the self-employed. Specif-
ically, we document a large increase in the probability of having positive income and also a
large increase in monthly income conditional on having positive income. Column (1)-(3) of
Table 2.4 summarizes the regression result of estimating the equation (2) using dummy vari-
able for having positive income as an outcome variable. The result implies that there is about
4% point increase in probability of having positive income for the cohort whose fraction of
individuals with college education increased discretely. Figure 2.8 graphically supports the
regression result. In particular, there is a discrete jump in fraction of self-employed with
positive income at the birth year cutoff.
Moreover, we find that the self-employed worker with higher education have higher income
than their counterparts. Column (4)-(6) presents the result for estimating equation (2) using
log of monthly income of self-employed workers. The controls in Column (4)-(6) are included
as same as before. For various specification, the estimate of the main coefficient is positive
and statistically significant. In particular, the log of monthly labor income is about is about
10% higher for the cohort at the birth year cutoff. The graphical evidence which is illustrated
in Figure 2.9, is also consistent with the regression result, as there is a discrete jump in the
average log monthly income for the cohorts who are initially affected by the policy. Thus,
the evidence from both regression result and graphical illustration provides a strong evidence
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supporting the monetary return of higher education for self-employed workers.
Overall, our results suggest that the 1980 education reform had sizable monetary returns
on individuals who are affected by the reform. Considering South Korea’s rapid growth in the
late 1980s to early 1990s, which induced large demand for high skilled workers, combined
with the low level of initial college graduates, the size of the impact on earnings seems
reasonable.
Employment and Class of Worker
In this subsection, we document the effect of higher education on employment and on
class of workers.
First, we examine the causal effect of education on the probability of being employed.
Column (1)-(3) of Table 2.5 summarizes the reduced form effect of college education on
employment. Controls in the Column (1)-(3) are included as before. For all specifications,
the main coefficient indicates the reduced-form effect of higher education on the likelihood
of being employed to be around 4% points. Moreover, the estimate of the main coefficient
is statistically significant at 1%. The result demonstrates that the cohorts who obtained
more higher education due to the exogenous education reform, are slightly more likely to
be employed. Thus, the result supports the moderate but positive causal effect of higher
education on probability of being employed.
We also examine the effect of higher education on narrowly-defined employment of the
workers. In particular, we exclude non-paid family workers from the employment and re-
estimate the equation (2) for various specification. Column (4)-(6) in Table 2.5 summarizes
the regression result. Consistent with the previous result, the regression result shows a
positive effect of higher education on probability of being employed which excludes the non-
paid family workers from the employment.
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The graphical illustrations for the impact of higher education on employment and narrowly-
defined employment is illustrated in Figure 2.10 and Figure 2.11, respectively. For both defi-
nition of employment, the graph illustrates a moderate but discrete increase in the proportion
of the employed workers at the birth year cutoff.
We also examine the effect of higher education on class of workers. In particular, we
examine whether the individual with higher education are more likely to be become salary
workers. The result does not provide strong evidence for effect of higher education on being
salary worker nor being a fulltime workers conditional on being salary workers.
Column (1)-(3) in Table 2.6 summarizes the regression result for using the dummy vari-
able for being the salary workers as an outcome variable. For all specification, the estimated
coefficients are positive. However, the coefficients are not precisely estimated and are not sta-
tistically significant due to large standard errors. Figure 2.12 describes the relation between
birth cohort and the fraction of salary workers among employed. The fitted linear spline
do show a slight increase in fraction of salary workers at the birth year cutoff, however, the
discrete jump is not clear as mean of residual is noisy.
Column (4)-(6) Table 2.6 reports the effect of higher education on being a fulltime salary
workers. The result show little effect of the higher education on being fulltime workers the
as estimate of the main coefficient is small and statistically insignificant for all specifications.
All in all, we find that college education have moderate but positive effect on being employed,
but little impact on class of workers conditional on being employed.
Occupational Choice
Finally, we examine the effect of higher education on occupational choice and also explore
whether higher education affects the type of industries that workers work in. We examine
the impact of higher education on the probability of being blue-collar workers and on the
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probability of working in the service sector (tertiary sector).
The coefficients in Column (1)-(3) and (4)-(6) of Table 2.7 presents the reduced form
effect of the higher education on probability of being blue-collar among all workers and
among salary workers, respectively. The results demonstrate that cohort at the birth year
cutoff have discretely lower fraction of blue-collar workers. Specifically, among all workers,
cohort who are born at the birth year cutoff are about 9% point less likely to become blue-
collar workers. Similarly, for the salary workers, cohorts who were at the birth year cutoff
are about 12% point less likely to become blue-collar workers. The estimated coefficients
are robust across specifications and statistically significant at 1%. Figure 2.14 and 2.15
graphically confirms the findings by illustrating the discrete decrease in the fraction of blue-
collar workers at the birth year cutoff.
Moreover, we show that among salary workers, the individuals with higher education are
more likely to be employed in the service sector. Table 2.8 summarizes the impact of higher
education on the probability of working in service sector separately for all workers and for
salary workers only.
In particular, Columns (4)-(6) show that among salary workers, the cohort who was born
at the birth year cutoff have discretely higher probability of working in the service sector.
The fraction of individuals working the service sector increases for about 7% point at the
birth year cutoff. Moreover, the coefficient is statistically significant at 5%. Thus, the results
show that the higher education positively affects the probability of working in the service
sector among salary workers.
Overall, the result in this subsection shows that higher education affects the occupational
choice of workers and likelihood of working in the tertiary sector.
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Job Attachment During the Asian Financial Crisis
The main aim of this subsection is to analyze the role of higher education for labour
market attachment during recessions. We begin from the observation that welfare losses from
unemployment are larger during economic downturns; limited employment opportunities may
result in long term unemployment, involuntary early retirement or reattachment to a worse
job match.
The recession of focus took place during the Asian financial crisis between 1997 and
1998. Signs of economic instability were observed in early 1997 when major firms started
defaulting. Stock markets plummeted in the third quarter, triggered by the default of Kia
Motors in July 1997. The KRW depreciated precipitously in November; between the third
and the fourth quarter of 1997, KRW to USD exchange rate increased by 27 percent, with
additional 40 percent increase in first quarter of 1998.15 Response in the Labor market
followed. In the third quarter of 1998, unemployment rate reached its peak of 8.2 percent,
from its average of 2.6 percent in 1997. Even after the crisis, the unemployment rate level
failed to return to its pre-crisis level, and remained above 3 percent to this day.
We test whether higher education has any impact on the likelihood of job detachment
during an economic contraction. We define individuals to have experienced a job loss during
the crisis if unemployment occurred in year 1997 or 1998. We restrict our analysis to indi-
viduals who started out with a job in 1996, so that the outcome of interest is job loss rather
than unemployment status. We restrict analysis to individuals who were first interviewed in
the first wave, because the employment history near the crisis period is most accurate for
this sample as the first wave was surveyed in 1998.16
15Source: OECD (2010), ”Main Economic Indicators – complete database”
16For these group of interviewees’ there is a separate code for “last job lost prior to the interview,” which
is particularly coded to capture job loss as a result of the crisis.
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In Table 2.11, we find that higher education significantly lowers the likelihood of job loss
during the crisis. Estimates indicate that college educated workers were 13-14 percentage
points less likely to lose jobs during the crisis. The drop in the job loss likelihood is stark, as
seen in Figure 2.18. Both pieces of evidence imply that the college educated better survived
the financial crisis of 1997 relative to those who were not. It suggests that the labour market
advantage of higher education may widen in recessions.
2.5.3 Household Savings
In this section, we study the impact of college education on household savings behavior.
This is, to my knowledge, the first paper to study how higher education affect households’
savings behavior. We further try to shed light on the broader question of the relationship
between income and saving rates; i.e. whether individuals with more income are also more
likely to save a larger proportion of their income.
We first examine if higher education has an impact on whether the household had positive
amount of savings last month. We estimate reduced form regressions, with an indicator for
whether the household had any savings last month as the dependent variable. We restrict
the analysis to household heads due to saving information being collected at the household
level.
We find that the likelihood of saving last month increases significantly in Table 2.9,
columns (1)-(3). Having some college education increases the likelihood by 6 percentage
points, which is far from negligible considering that the average likelihood of saving last
month is 0.93 for the sample.
In columns (4)-(6), we present the impact of higher education on the log amount of
monthly household savings, restricting to individuals with positive amount of monthly sav-
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ings.17 We find sizable impact of higher education on savings: having some college education
increases average household monthly savings by 20 percent. The treatment effect is graph-
ically illustrated in Figure 2.19. This result implies that an increase in the proportion of
college educated individuals may boost economic activity by increasing savings, and thereby
increasing loanable funds for investment in the economy.
Log monthly savings is a useful measure for flow of savings, or a savings measure to
calculate the available amount of loanable funds in the economy. However, this flow of savings
might not fully capture which medium households use to preserve wealth value or generate
buffer stocks. An alternative measure for savings could be home ownership. If households,
instead of saving monthly in increments, could have instead purchased housing with lump
sum savings, or saved in the form of paying off housing loans. To explore this possibility, we
perform regressions on two additional dependent variables. First is an indicator for dwelling
ownership, which takes a value of one if the current residence is owned by the household and
zero otherwise. Some households may own a house, but could be renting it out and instead
living in another dwelling, so the second variable is an indicator for home ownership; whether
the household owns any housing regardless of ownership status of current residence.18
We find no impact of college education on either measure of home ownership. We summa-
rize this result in appendix table B.2. This result does not necessarily imply that households
do not accumulate savings through the housing market; value of of housing rather than bi-
nary ownership of housing could be a better measure, i.e. behavioral responses might be
present if we were to analyze the total value invested in real estate. However, this is not
17Both the regression results and residual plots are robust to including individuals with zero savings. Once
individuals with zero savings are included, some college education increases amount of monthly savings by
approximately 40 percent. See appendix Table B.1 and Figure B.2.
18The data is unable to distinguish whether the household owns a single non-residence housing, or multiple
housings
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a straightforward task, because South Korea has three types of housing contracts; home
purchase, monthly rental and Jeonse,19 making it difficult to measure the value of savings in
housing with the current data. We leave it as future work.
Next, we address the broader question of whether richer households save a higher pro-
portion of their income, i.e. have higher rate of savings. Knowing that college education
increases labor income from the previous subsection, we use this policy experiment to ex-
plore the relationship between income and saving rates. We define saving rate as monthly
savings over monthly household labor income.20 The advantage of our empirical approach
is in reducing the measurement error in income, as discrete change in the proportion of
individuals with college education helps identify saving behavior induced by the change in
the permanent component of income. Previously we found that the labor income increases
for both the wage worker and self employed workers in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4, as well
as permanent upward shift in wage income for salary workers in Figure2.7, which seems to
suggest that indeed education increases permanent income.
We find a positive relationship between labor income and saving rates at the policy change
cutoff for wage workers in Table 2.10.21 On the other hand, we do not find any impact on
saving rates for self-employed workers in columns (4)-(6). These differing patterns are well
19This is a rental system that is almost exclusively found in Korea. At its peak in the mid-1990s, two
thirds of all housing rents and leases and 30% of all dwellings used Jeonse contract (Shin and Kim, 2013).
Under this contract, tenant was granted two years of residence by providing about 40-60 percent of the total
home value as a deposit without no additional monthly rent. The landlord earns interest proceeds from the
deposit, and at the end of the contract, is obliged to fully refund the original deposit.
20This variable is collected since wave 4. We use this labor income as at the main denominator to be
consistent with monthly measure of savings. Alternative denominators include household’s yearly labor in-
come; for this denominator, we multiply savings by 12 months assuming regular monthly savings to construct
household saving rate. Another denominator is household head’s monthly labor income. We find robust and
consistent results across these alternative saving rate measures. Results available upon request.
21We restrict regression to households whose monthly labor income is greater or equal to 100KRW (ap-
proximately 1000 USD) and those with saving rate less than or equal to 1.
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summarized in Figure 2.20. In short, richer wage workers save a larger proportion of their
income as income increases, but the pattern does not exist for self-employed workers.
One possible reason for the different behavior response for wage workers and self-employed
workers is measurement error associated with this definition of saving rates. It could be that
income for self-employed is more difficult to measure, as they may have more diverse income
sources other than labor income that might include capital gains on housing, financial as-
sets, owned businesses, and other components of wealth as noted in Dynan et al. (2004). If
labor income tends to be relatively transitory, and other types of income are more perma-
nent, than it is possible that for self-employed workers, saving rate does not co-move with
labor income.This implies that the used definition of saving rate may be less pertinent for
self-employed workers. Another possibility is that motivation for savings might be different
depending on the type of worker; for instance, wage workers mostly use savings for invest-
ment, whereas self-employed workers focus on precautionary savings. Finally, it is possible
that other definitions of savings besides active flow of savings may display different patterns.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the causal impact of college education using the education
reform in Korea which exogenously increased the opportunity to engage in higher education
for the disadvantaged population. Due to the mandatory school entry law, the education
reform had the initial impact on the cohorts who were born on 1962. This creates the discrete
disparity in the opportunity to obtain higher education across otherwise comparable adjacent
cohorts. We exploit this exogenous variation in the opportunity and employ a regression
discontinuity design to estimate the impact of higher education on various labor market
outcomes.
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We first confirm the discrete increase in fraction of individuals with higher education
attainment the for the cohort who were born on 1962. This discrete increase in higher
education attainment allows us to interpret the discrete increase in labor market outcomes at
the birth year cutoff to be interpreted as the causal effect of higher education. In particular,
consistent with the previous literature, we find that having college education improves labor
market outcomes through increase in the earnings. The increase in earnings is present for
both salary workers and self employed workers. Moreover, we also find that the individuals
with higher education are more likely to be employed compared to the individuals who did
not receive higher education. In addition, we find that the higher education affects the
occupational choice of the workers. Specifically, we document that individuals with higher
education are less likely to become blue-collar workers and more likely to work in the service
sector.
As a final labor market outcome, we study job attachment and job detachment during the
recession of 1997 in South Korea. We find that individuals with higher education were much
less likely to lose job during this recession. Overall, we find a strong evidence supporting
the impact of higher education on various labor market outcomes.
Next, we show that college education has an impact on households’ saving behavior. We
find that households with college educated household head save significantly larger amount
. Furthermore, we also find that wage workers save a greater share of their income as their
income increases at the policy discontinuity. We find no such pattern for self-employed
workers using our measure of saving rate.
The main policy implication of this paper is that promoting college education is beneficial
at least in two respects: improvement in labor market outcomes and increase in household
savings. The estimate of this paper might not be generalizable to countries that already
have high proportion of higher education attainment. However, we believe that this paper
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yields important implications for subsidizing higher education in developing countries or for
the disadvantage population with low higher education-levels.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
sample with birth year<1962 sample with birth year>=1962
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
education>=some college 8844 0.126 0.332 8829 0.326 0.469
education>=college 8844 0.108 0.310 8829 0.283 0.451
employed 8844 0.874 0.331 8829 0.881 0.323
salary worker 7730 0.583 0.493 7781 0.765 0.424
full time worker 4479 0.971 0.167 5926 0.973 0.161
blue collar 7460 0.437 0.496 7646 0.372 0.483
service sector worker 7730 0.527 0.499 7781 0.551 0.497
positive wage 4507 0.994 0.080 5955 0.995 0.070
monthly wage(salary) 3723 263.1 477.9 5239 247.7 297.5
positive income(self employed) 3128 0.891 0.311 1724 0.939 0.240
monthly income 2285 308.8 335.8 1402 326.4 380.1
age 8844 47.6 4.6 8829 34.5 5.0
birthyear 8844 1954.5 4.5 8829 1968.9 4.7
father education>primary 8844 0.175 0.380 8829 0.388 0.487
place of birth urban 8844 0.016 0.124 8829 0.031 0.173
residence urban 8844 0.648 0.478 8829 0.517 0.500
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Table 2.2: First Stage Results
Dependent variable education>=some college education>=college graduate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treat 0.0995*** 0.0960*** 0.0946*** 0.1003*** 0.0923*** 0.0970***
(0.0200) (0.0205) (0.0199) (0.0205) (0.0213) (0.0212)
Linear Spline Y Y Y Y Y Y
Additional Control Y Y Y Y
Predetermined Variables Y Y
adj. R-sq 0.066 0.085 0.125 0.058 0.085 0.119
N 17673 17673 17673 17673 17673 17673
All specification includes birth cohort and interaction between birth cohort and treat variable. Specification (2) and (5)
controls for location or residence and dummy variables for class of workers. Addition ally, specification (3) and (6) controls for
predetermined variables such as parent’s education. The standard errors are clustered at the birth cohort level. Treat is
defined as 1 for individuals born on or after January 1, 1962 and 0 for individuals born on or before December 31, 1961
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
Table 2.3: Effect of College Education on Wage of Salary Workers
Dependent variable Positive Wage Log Monthly Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treat 0.0019 0.0022 0.0022 0.1228*** 0.1214*** 0.1155***
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0282) (0.0290) (0.0280)
Linear Spline Y Y Y Y Y Y
Additional Control Y Y Y Y
Predetermined Variables Y Y
adj. R-sq 0.000 0.004 0.003 0.187 0.220 0.237
N 10462 10462 10462 8128 8128 8128
All specification includes birth cohort and interaction between birth cohort and treat variable. Specification (2) and (5)
controls for location or residence and dummy variables for class of workers. Addition ally, specification (3) and (6) controls for
predetermined variables such as parent’s education. The standard errors are clustered at the birth cohort level. Treat is
defined as 1 for individuals born on or after January 1, 1962 and 0 for individuals born on or before December 31, 1961
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
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Table 2.4: Effect of College Education on Income of Self Employed
Dependent variable Positive Income Log Monthly Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treat 0.0493*** 0.0461*** 0.0500*** 0.1078*** 0.0980*** 0.0950**
(0.0124) (0.0129) (0.0137) (0.0334) (0.0334) (0.0356)
Linear Spline Y Y Y Y Y Y
Additional Control Y Y Y Y
Predetermined Variables Y Y
adj. R-sq 0.026 0.035 0.034 0.091 0.109 0.138
N 4852 4852 4852 3687 3687 3687
All specification includes birth cohort and interaction between birth cohort and treat variable. Specification (2) and (5)
controls for location or residence and dummy variables for class of workers. Addition ally, specification (3) and (6) controls for
predetermined variables such as parent’s education. The standard errors are clustered at the birth cohort level. Treat is
defined as 1 for individuals born on or after January 1, 1962 and 0 for individuals born on or before December 31, 1961
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
Table 2.5: Effect of College Education on Employment
Dependent variable employed employed (excluding non-paid workers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treat 0.0408*** 0.0402*** 0.0416*** 0.0392*** 0.0388*** 0.0399***
(0.0143) (0.0140) (0.0135) (0.0141) (0.0135) (0.0130)
Linear Spline Y Y Y Y Y Y
Additional Control Y Y Y Y
Predetermined Variables Y Y
adj. R-sq 0.030 0.032 0.037 0.028 0.032 0.036
N 17673 17673 17673 17673 17673 17673
All specification includes birth cohort and interaction between birth cohort and treat variable. Specification (2) and (5)
controls for location or residence and dummy variables for class of workers. Addition ally, specification (3) and (6) controls for
predetermined variables such as parent’s education. The standard errors are clustered at the birth cohort level. Treat is
defined as 1 for individuals born on or after January 1, 1962 and 0 for individuals born on or before December 31, 1961
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
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Table 2.6: Effect of College Education on being Salary and Full time workers
Dependent variable Salary Worker Full Time Worker
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treat 0.0377 0.0394 0.0389 -0.0002 -0.0012 0.0003
(0.0259) (0.0269) (0.0273) (0.0080) (0.0081) (0.0089)
Linear Spline Y Y Y Y Y Y
Additional Control Y Y Y Y
Predetermined Variables Y Y
adj. R-sq 0.051 0.063 0.071 0.007 0.013 0.019
N 15511 15511 15511 10405 10405 10405
All specification includes birth cohort and interaction between birth cohort and treat variable. Specification (2) and (5)
controls for location or residence and dummy variables for class of workers. Addition ally, specification (3) and (6) controls for
predetermined variables such as parent’s education. The standard errors are clustered at the birth cohort level. Treat is
defined as 1 for individuals born on or after January 1, 1962 and 0 for individuals born on or before December 31, 1961
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
Table 2.7: Effect of College Education on being Blue Collar Workers
Dependent variable Blue Collar Blue Collar among Salary Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treat -0.0907*** -0.0885*** -0.0849** -0.1357*** -0.1273*** -0.1254***
(0.0314) (0.0323) (0.0347) (0.0349) (0.0366) (0.0427)
Linear Spline Y Y Y Y Y Y
Additional Control Y Y Y Y
Predetermined Variables Y Y
adj. R-sq 0.014 0.029 0.058 0.021 0.041 0.074
N 15106 15106 15106 10307 10307 10307
All specification includes birth cohort and interaction between birth cohort and treat variable. Specification (2) and (5)
controls for location or residence and dummy variables for class of workers. Addition ally, specification (3) and (6) controls for
predetermined variables such as parent’s education. The standard errors are clustered at the birth cohort level. Treat is
defined as 1 for individuals born on or after January 1, 1962 and 0 for individuals born on or before December 31, 1961
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
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Table 2.8: Effect of College Education on being Service Sector Workers
Dependent variable Service Sector Service Sector among Salary Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treat 0.0498 0.0442 0.0416 0.0873** 0.0762** 0.0814**
(0.0327) (0.0310) (0.0305) (0.0376) (0.0344) (0.0356)
Linear Spline Y Y Y Y Y Y
Additional Control Y Y Y Y
Predetermined Variables Y Y
adj. R-sq 0.002 0.021 0.041 0.010 0.037 0.066
N 15511 15511 15511 10462 10462 10462
All specification includes birth cohort and interaction between birth cohort and treat variable. Specification (2) and (5)
controls for location or residence and dummy variables for class of workers. Addition ally, specification (3) and (6) controls for
predetermined variables such as parent’s education. The standard errors are clustered at the birth cohort level. Treat is
defined as 1 for individuals born on or after January 1, 1962 and 0 for individuals born on or before December 31, 1961
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
Table 2.9: Effect of College Education on Household Savings Behavior
Dependent variable Positive Savings Log Monthly Savings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treat 0.0631*** 0.0638*** 0.0620*** 0.2068*** 0.2089*** 0.2035***
(0.0216) (0.0197) (0.0195) (0.0457) (0.0438) (0.0428)
Linear Spline Y Y Y Y Y Y
Additional Control Y Y Y Y
Predetermined Variables Y Y
adj. R-sq 0.0378 0.0744 0.0797 0.0213 0.0511 0.0550
N 15133 15133 15133 11422 11422 11422
All specification includes birth cohort and interaction between birth cohort and treat variable. Specification (2) and (5)
controls for location or residence and dummy variables for class of workers. Addition ally, specification (3) and (6) controls for
predetermined variables such as parent’s education. The standard errors are clustered at the birth cohort level. Treat is
defined as 1 for individuals born on or after January 1, 1962 and 0 for individuals born on or before December 31, 1961
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
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Table 2.10: Effect of College Education on Household Savings Behavior
Dependent variable Saving Rate of Wage Workers Saving Rate of Self-Employed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treat 0.0400*** 0.0392*** 0.0376*** 0.0138 0.0168 0.0152
(0.0118) (0.0106) (0.0093) (0.0185) (0.0172) (0.0177)
Linear Spline Y Y Y Y Y Y
Additional Control Y Y Y Y
Predetermined Variables Y Y
adj. R-sq 0.055 0.077 0.082 0.023 0.045 0.047
N 6144 6144 6144 2650 2650 2650
All specification includes birth cohort and interaction between birth cohort and treat variable. Specification (2) and (5)
controls for location or residence and dummy variables for class of workers. Addition ally, specification (3) and (6) controls for
predetermined variables such as parent’s education. The standard errors are clustered at the birth cohort level. Treat is
defined as 1 for individuals born on or after January 1, 1962 and 0 for individuals born on or before December 31, 1961
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
Table 2.11: Effect of College Education on The Likelihood of Job Loss During Recession
Dependent variable Probability of Job Loss
(1) (2) (3)
treat -0.1209*** -0.1267*** -0.1204***
(0.0335) (0.0328) (0.0353)
Linear Spline Y Y Y
Additional Control Y Y
Predetermined Variables Y
adj. R-sq 0.056 0.056 0.057
N 2045 2045 2045
All specification includes birth cohort and interaction between birth cohort and treat variable. Specification (2) and (5)
controls for location or residence and dummy variables for class of workers. Addition ally, specification (3) and (6) controls for
predetermined variables such as parent’s education. The standard errors are clustered at the birth cohort level. Treat is
defined as 1 for individuals born on or after January 1, 1962 and 0 for individuals born on or before December 31, 1961
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
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Figure 2.1: Trend of freshmen quota and actual freshmen enrollment
Figure 2.2: Pre-trend of individuals with at least some college education
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Figure 2.3: Proportion of Individuals with Father’s Education more than Primary
Figure 2.4: Density of observation across cohorts
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Figure 2.5: First stage
(a) Panel A : education>=some college
(b) Panel B : education>college
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Figure 2.6: Average Log Monthly Wage Across Cohorts
(a) Panel A : basic controls
(b) Panel B : full controls
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Figure 2.7: Lifetime Wage Profile by Age
(a) Panel A : Ages 36 - 50
(b) Panel B : Ages 39- 47
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Figure 2.8: Proportion of Self Employed with Positive Income
(a) Panel A : basic controls
(b) Panel B : full controls
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Figure 2.9: Average Log Monthly Income of Self Employed
(a) Panel A : basic controls
(b) Panel B : full controls
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Figure 2.10: Proportion of Employed Across Birth Cohorts
(a) Panel A : basic controls
(b) Panel B : full controls
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Figure 2.11: Proportion of Employed (Excluding Non-paid Workers) Across Birth Cohorts
(a) Panel A : basic controls
(b) Panel B : full controls
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Figure 2.12: Proportion of Salary Workers
(a) Panel A : basic controls
(b) Panel B : full controls
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Figure 2.13: Proportion of Full Time Workers
(a) Panel A : basic controls
(b) Panel B : full controls
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Figure 2.14: Proportion of Blue Collar Workers
(a) Panel A : basic controls
(b) Panel B : full controls
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Figure 2.15: Proportion of Blue Collar among Salary Workers
(a) Panel A : basic controls
(b) Panel B : full controls
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Figure 2.16: Proportion of Service Sector Workers
(a) Panel A : basic controls
(b) Panel B : full controls
86
(c) Panel A : basic controls
(d) Panel B : full controls
Figure 2.17: Proportion of Service Sector Workers among Salary Workers
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(a) Panel A : All Workers
(b) Panel B : Wage Workers
Figure 2.18: Likelihood of Job Loss During Crisis
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(a) Panel A : basic controls
(b) Panel B : full controls
Figure 2.19: Average Log Monthly Savings
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(a) Panel A : Wage Workers
(b) Panel B : Self -Employed Workers
Figure 2.20: Saving Rates
Chapter 3
Does Higher Education Affect Health
and Health Behaviors?: Evidence
from Korea
with Jisun Baek and WooRam Park
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3.1 Introduction
The causal effect of education on health is of interest for both economists and policy
makers. Reflecting this interest, numerous studies document the strong correlation between
education and health.1 However, it is not clear whether this correlation reflects a causal effect.
In particular, many unobserved factors could simultaneously affect individuals’ education
attainment and health. In addition, the reverse causality between health and education
could also exist. That is, healthier individuals are more likely to obtain college educations.
Thus, studies that do not properly address the endogeneity in education could overstate
the effect of education on health. Addressing the endogeneity in education, some papers
recently investigate the causal effect of education on health related outcomes. The evidence
from these papers is mixed unlike evidence from correlation studies.2
The purpose of this paper is to provide new evidence regarding the causal effect of educa-
tion on health related outcomes. Specifically, the exogenous education reform in Korea dis-
cretely increased the availability of college education for individuals targeted by this reform.
This discrete increase allows us to address the endogeneity in higher education attainment
and reveal the causal effect of college education on health related outcomes. In particular,
this discrete change in the opportunity induced by the exogenous education reform along
1For instance, it is well known that one additional year of education is associated with longer life ex-
pectancy and less chronic diseases (Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2008, 2010). Other studies indicate that
educational attainment is negatively correlated with smoking and excessive drinking which are known to
have negative effects on health (Sander, 1995a,b).
2For instance, using state-level variation in compulsory education laws in the U.S., Lleras-Muney (2005)
finds that an increase in educational attainment lowers mortality, and Oreopoulos (2007) finds a positive
effect of secondary education on self-reported health. In contrast, Clark and Royer (2013) exploits two
changes in British compulsory schooling laws and find little evidence on the effect of additional education
on mortality and self-reported health. Similarly, Albouy and Lequien (2009) finds little effect of education
on health, using a compulsory school reform in France. Moreover, other studies such as ? and de Walque
(2007) find that schooling has a negative effect on smoking rates whereas Park and Kang (2008) find little
effect of education on smoking.
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with the compulsory school entrance law created a discrete difference in opportunities to
obtain college education between the cohorts who were born only a month apart. We exploit
this sharp difference in the proportion of the population with college education across adja-
cent cohorts and apply a regression discontinuity design to identify the causal effect of higher
education. This identification strategy requires the relatively mild assumption that the un-
derlying characteristics that could affect health and education attainment do not change
discretely across the cohorts.
Using Korea Welfare Panel Study(KOWEPS) data, we document three findings in this
paper. First, we confirm that the cohorts affected by the education reform are more likely to
have college educations than the slightly older cohorts. Second, we find that education has a
limited effect on health related outcomes such as health being self-reported as poor or having
diseases. In particular, despite the discrete increase in the proportion of individuals with
higher education at the birth year cutoff, we do not observe any similar discrete changes
in the proportion of individuals reporting their own health as poor or in the probability
of their having diseases. Our next set of results indicates a possible reason why higher
education has little effect on health outcomes according to our findings. We document that
higher education has a limited influence on behaviors known to have negative effects on
health. Specifically, we do not find supportive evidence that higher education negatively
affects the probability of currently smoking or ever having smoked. In addition, we do
not find evidence that higher education negatively affects frequency or amount of alcohol
consumption. Overall, our results suggest that the strong correlation between health related
outcomes and education reported in existing studies might be largely due to endogeneity in
higher education attainment and/or a reverse causality between health and education.
This paper is related to the group of research exploiting an education reform at the
national level, which differently affects adjacent birth cohorts according to timing of birth.
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Such studies adopted a regression discontinuity design to compare the outcomes for the
cohorts affected by the nation-wide reform and those born slightly earlier and, thus, were
less likely to be affected by the reform. For instance, Clark and Royer (2013) uses the two
education reforms at the national level in Britain that induced the cohort of 14 year-olds in
1947 and that of 15 year-olds in 1972 to stay in school longer by raising the age for leaving
school. They exploit this discrete change in educational attainment across adjacent cohorts
and apply the regression discontinuity using birth cohort as a forcing variable to identify the
causal effect of education on mortality and health behaviors.3
This paper contributes in two major ways to the literature using a regression discontinuity
design to examine the effect of education. First, this paper investigates the effect of higher
education on health, which could be different from the effect of secondary education on
health. Most papers using a regression discontinuity design examine the effects of additional
years of secondary education on health (Oreopoulos, 2006). However, recent work shows that
the returns from college education might differ from the returns from secondary education in
many aspects (Iranzo and Peri, 2009; Arcidiacono, Bayer, and Hizmo, 2010). Moreover, the
return from higher education on health related outcomes could exhibit a different pattern
from the effect of college education on earnings. This paper contributes to the literature by
examining the health return of higher education.
Moreover, this paper adds to the literature by extending the scope of the examined effects
of education on health behaviors. Previous studies have mainly focused on the incidence of
health behaviors—whether individuals are currently smoking or drinking. For instance, Park
3Similarly, Malamud and Pop-Eleches (2010) uses the education reform of 1973 adopted at the national
level in Romania. Specifically, the reform discretely increased the general high school attainment for those
who were born in 1958. They apply the regression discontinuity design and compare the outcome of the
individuals born in or slightly after 1958 to the outcome of those born slightly earlier to identify the effect
of general education as oppose to vocational education. Oreopoulos (2006), Albouy and Lequien (2009) and
Malamud and Pop-Eleches (2011) also uses the regression discontinuity design with birth cohort as a forcing
variable.
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and Kang (2008) and Clark and Royer (2013) examines the effect of education on health
behaviors mainly on the extensive margin, and they find that secondary education has little
causal effect on being a current smoker. In this paper, we not only examine the incidence but
the intensity of the health behaviors and explore the effect of higher education on amount
of cigarette and alcohol consumption. In particular, we find, for a current smoker higher
education attainment reduces the probability of smoking more than 10 cigarettes per day.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we discuss detailed infor-
mation about the reform of the Korean education system we exploit. The overview of the
main data, KOWEPS, and the sample construction are described in Section 3.3 followed by
discussion of the strategy and the estimating equation in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 includes
the main empirical results. We summarize and conclude the paper in Section 3.6.
3.2 Background
Korea provides a unique setting for this type of research because the central government
regulated the admission guidelines for both private and public colleges—practically, for most
types of colleges. In particular, the government delineated detailed procedures for admission
and the factors that should be considered or should not be reflected when ranting admissions
to students. Moreover, the government controlled access to college education by regulating
the number of higher education institutions and the number of freshman students who could
be admitted to colleges—the freshman quota.4 In particular, despite the rising demand for
college education, the government adjusted the quota only to a limited extent during the
4Establishing a new college required a government permission, and the government kept the number
of colleges more or less stable during the time of our study. In addition, the freshman quota was strictly
administered and was subject to a sizable noncompliance penalty including loss of government funding or
subsidy and a reduction in the freshman quota in following years. These two restrictions rendered the supply
of college graduates exogenous to the demand for college education and the returns to a college education.
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1970s. Thus, many individuals who wanted to benefit from higher education could not enter
a college during the 1970s. The college admission rule and the opportunity to obtain a
college education, however, changed radically because of the education reform of July 30,
1980. This change was unexpected because it was a strategic action by a military junta.
Specifically, the reform quickly followed the formation of a military junta by coup d’ètat in
December, 1979 subsequent to President Park Chung-hee’s assassination on October 1979.
The main objective of the reform was to gain popularity by expanding the chance of entering
college for disadvantaged people.
The education reform consisted of four main components, all of which were intended
to increase higher education attainment for the disadvantaged population which previously
had a little chances of obtaining higher education. First, the government abolished the
“Bongosa”—a college-specific entrance exam students were required to pass to enter college.
Preparing for the college-specific test was costly because students had to prepare for the
college-specific exam at each college to which they were applying. Moreover, the scope
of the exam was often beyond the regular curriculum of high school and often required
private tutoring or cram schooling. The government substituted this exam with a nationally
administrated exam “Haklyeoggosa”. Unlike the “Bongosa”, exam was largely based on
the regular curriculum of high school, so the new system benefited students who could not
afford tutoring service. Second, the government forced each college to reflect the relative
ranking of student within each high school when giving admission to the students. Thus, the
students in the disadvantaged region would have benefited from this policy, as the relative
ranking within each high school does not take overall difference in the ability of students
across high schools into account. Third, the government prohibited private tutoring, which
was largely conducted in the regions with many college students, such as metropolitan cities.
Moreover, because the tuition for private tutoring was expensive, students from affluent
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backgrounds generally took advantage of the private tutoring. Therefore, by prohibiting
such private tutoring, the government could effectively increase the chances of the students
in the rural regions with disadvantaged backgrounds to obtain higher educations. Finally,
the government discretely increased the freshman quota, by forcing each colleges to admit
more students. This increase also benefited individuals with disadvantaged backgrounds who
previously had to compete with better prepared students for the limited slots.
Overall, the education reform discretely increased chances of attaining college educations,
especially for the disadvantaged population. This discrete increase in the opportunity for
a college education in 1981, combined with the mandatory school entrance law in Korea,
created a large difference in the opportunity to obtain college educations across adjacent
cohorts. To be specific, as an individual who is 7 years old as of March is mandated—with
few exceptions—to enter an elementary school that year, so most individuals born in 1962
would have entered college in 1981 after completing six years of elementary school, three
years of middle school and three years of high school. Thus, they were the first cohort to
which the new college admission rule was applied. Because of the new rule, cohorts born in or
after 1962 would show a higher proportion of individuals with college educations compared
to slightly older cohorts. This exogenous discontinuity in the opportunity to obtain a college
education across otherwise comparable cohorts is our source of identification.
3.3 Data
To exploit the exogenous variation in higher education attainment across adjacent co-
horts, we use the Korea Welfare Panel Study (KOWEPS hereafter), collected since 2006.
The data are collected by the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs and Department
of Social Welfare at Seoul National University. The data come from an annual household
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panel of roughly 5200 to 7000 households and include detailed demographic information for
each household member, such as birth year, gender, location of the residence during youth
and educational attainment. More importantly, the data contain the measures of health
and information for behaviors that could affect health, such as smoking and drinking. In
the main analysis, we pool seven waves—from the first to the seventh—which were collected
from 2006 to 2012. Hence, in our data set, the cohorts affected by the policy are in their mid
to late 40s. Therefore, the data allow us to examine the effect of higher education on health
outcomes at the time when the individuals are known to begin to develop chronic diseases.
Because the reform largely targeted the disadvantaged population, we limit our sample
to the population who were not affluent during their youth. Moreover, we exclude the
individuals resided in a metropolitan city in their youth, because the reform mainly benefited
students in rural areas and small cities where they have had relatively few opportunities to
obtain private tutoring. By restricting the sample to the group who were most likely to
be affected by the policy, we obtain a strong ‘first stage’ relationship and thus observe—a
large discrete increase in college education attainment in the birth cohort born in 1962. This
discrete variation in college education attainment across adjacent cohorts allows us to apply
the regression discontinuity design, explained in detail in the next section. In addition, we
limit the window of the main analysis to those whose birth years are 15 years before and
after the birth year cutoff.
Table 3.1 shows summary statistics. The first three columns contain the number of
observation, mean and the standard deviation of the variables for individuals with less than
college education. Columns (5) and (6) describe the mean and the standard deviation for
the sample who received at least some college education. Individuals with at least some
college education are younger because the higher education attainment is higher for younger
cohorts. In addition, they are less likely to be female, reflecting the educational gender gap
98
for the cohorts born in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s. Furthermore, individuals with
some college education have lower probability of reporting their health status as poor and
are less likely to have diseases. While health measures differ across two educational groups,
the health behaviors—smoking and drinking—exhibits similar patterns. Finally, parents’
educational level and the probability of being employed are higher for the sample with at
least some college education attainment.
3.4 Estimating Equation
To exploit the discrete change in higher educational attainment across adjacent cohorts,
we adopt the regression discontinuity design (Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw, 2001; Imbens
and Lemieux, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010). The idea of the regression discontinuity design
is to compare the outcome of the cohorts initially affected by the education reform of 1980
to that of the cohorts born slightly earlier and thus were less likely to be affected. As
noted in Section 3.1, the identification strategy is similar to those of such previous studies
as Oreopoulos (2006), Albouy and Lequien (2009), Malamud and Pop-Eleches (2011) and
Clark and Royer (2013) which use the nationwide reform that brought different effects across
adjacent cohorts. The research design relies on the fact that one cannot completely control
the timing of conception or the birth of children. In particular, among the individuals whose
birth year is close to 1962, being born after 1962—and thus being more likely to benefit
from the reform—can be seen as a random assignment. This setting naturally leads to the
regression discontinuity framework using birth year as a forcing variable.
Using the regression discontinuity framework, we first confirm the discrete increase in
higher education attainment at the birth year cutoff in our sample. In particular, we estimate
the following regression equation:
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Edui = δ0 + δ1Treati + f(birthyeari) + X
′
iΦ + εi (3.1)
where Edui is a dummy variable indicating whether individual i has some college education
or is a college graduate. Treati is a variable that takes value 1 if the individual i was
born on or after January, 1962 and 0 if born on or before December 1961. Xi is the set of
predetermined characteristics such as residence during youth, parents’ educational levels and
the occupation, all of which are known to affect educational attainment. The function of birth
year centered at 1962, f(birthyeari), captures the underlying relation between birth cohort
and education away from the cutoff. In particular, f(birthyeari) allows the main coefficient,
δ1, to identify the discrete increase in educational outcome at the birth year cutoff compared
to the slightly older cohorts which is arguably a good control group. Without f(birthyeari),
the coefficient of interest would reflect only the average difference in education attainment
between younger and older cohorts.
In this paper, we specify f(birthyeari) by a flexible polynomial function. Specifically,
we use a cubic spline—a cubic function of birthyeari, interacted with Treat—which allows
the cubic relation between outcome variable and birth cohort to be different across the birth
year cutoff. The coefficient of interest, δ1, estimates the discrete change in receiving college
education at the birth year cutoff and ultimately captures the effect of the educational
reform on higher education attainment. The error term is clustered on the birth year to
avoid complications associated with using a discrete forcing variable (Lee and Card, 2008).
After confirming the discrete increase in higher education attainment at the birth year
cutoff, one can attribute the discrete change in the outcome variable as a causal effect of
higher education on health. To be specific, we examine the reduced form effect of education
on the health related outcomes by estimating the following equation:
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Yi = γ0 + γ1Treati + f(birthyeari) + X
′
iΛ + εi (3.2)
where Yi is an outcome of interest such as the probability of having chronic disease or
behaviors known to affect health—for example, smoking and drinking. As in the first stage
regression, the underlying relation between outcome variable and birth cohort is controlled
by f(birthyeari). The coefficient of Treat, γ1, is our coefficient of interest and describes the
causal effect of education on the health-related outcome variable. X includes the variables
that can affect the outcome variable, such as the location of residence and economic activity
of individuals, and the predetermined characteristics of individuals. As before, the error
term, εi, is clustered at the birth year level.
The underlying assumption required for this identification method is that college educa-
tion attainment and the outcome variables are a smooth function of birth year in the absence
of the education reform. If this is the case, we can attribute the discontinuity in the relation
between the outcome variable and birth cohort as a causal effect of higher education. This is
a relatively mild assumption, since the endogenous sorting across birth cohorts—parents car-
ing about the education of children postponing the children’s births until after 1962—is not
a concern in our analysis. In particular, it is hard to imagine that parents could have fore-
seen the reform in 1980 when planning births in the late 1950s to early 1960s. Nonetheless,
we examine the possibility of endogenous sorting by plotting the density of the observation
across cohorts. In particular, McCrary (2008) suggest that if there is a endogenous sorting
one should observe the heaping of the density after the birth year cutoff. Figure 3.1 de-
scribes the density of the running variable. The density is smooth around the cutoff, thus a




Before we examine the causal effect of higher education on health related outcomes, we
confirm an impact of educational reform on higher education attainment. In particular,
we document discrete increase in the proportion of individuals with at least some college
education and the proportion of college graduates at the birth year cutoff. The upper and
lower panels of Figure 3.2 describe the fraction of individuals with at least some college
education and the fraction of college graduates by birth year, respectively. The x-axis of
the graph denotes birth year centered at 1962 and the y-axis of the graph indicates the
probability of receiving some college education or having a college degree. The fitted Lowess
trend for each side of the birth cohort cutoff is superimposed onto the graph. As seen in
Figure 3.2, one can verify that the fraction of individuals with college education increases
discretely at the cutoff of birth cohort born in 1962.
This graphic illustration is confirmed by Table 3.2 which reports the estimates of Equation
(1) for various specifications. For each set of results in Table 3.2, the first column provides
the results with no additional covariates other than the year fixed effects and controls for sex
and age square. In addition to the controls used in the first column, the result indicated in
the second column controls the variable that changes with time such as location of current
residence, marital status and employment. Finally, the third column report the regression
results which further control the predetermined characteristics of the individuals such as
location of residence during youth and educational attainment of the parents.
The regression results are consistent with Figure 3.2, documenting that the cohorts who
were born in 1962 have a discretely higher proportion of individuals with some college ed-
ucation than their slightly older cohorts. In particular, the estimate of coefficient of Treat
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indicates a discrete increase in the proportion of individuals with some college education
induced by education reform, by approximately seven percentage points or 25 percent. The
results for the fraction of college graduates summarized in Columns (4)-(6) in Table 3.2 also
exhibit a similar pattern.
The p-value and the related t-statistics of the estimated coefficient of Treat imply that the
reform is a valid and strong instrument for higher education attainment. Specifically, for all
specifications, the p-value for the estimated coefficient is less than 0.01—suggesting a strong
first stage relation between the educational reform and the higher education attainment for
the cohorts affected by the policy. In addition, the estimated coefficient is not sensitive to
the inclusion of the predetermined variables or additional covariates. This finding implies
the covariates that could affect the individuals educational attainment is not correlated with
being born either side of the birth year cutoff. Thus, the result further supports the validity
of the regression discontinuity design because being born after the birth year cutoff—thus
being treated—can be view as a random assignment. Overall, both graphical illustration and
regression results show that the exogenous education reform induced an exogenous increase
in college education attainment across otherwise comparable adjacent cohorts.
3.5.2 Health
In this subsection, we examine the causal effect of higher education on individuals’ health.
In particular, we explore whether a discrete change in health outcome is found in the birth
cohorts who experienced a discrete increase in higher education due to the education reform.
First, we find little evidence that college education has a positive effect on the subjective—
self reported—measures of health. Specifically, we find no discrete decrease at the birth year
cutoff in the fraction of individuals who reported their health status as poor. The upper panel
of Figure 3.3 describes the relation between birth cohort and the probability of reporting
103
health status as poor. There is a smooth negative relation between the two because members
of the younger cohort are less likely to have poor health, but there is no discrete downward
jump at the birth year centered on 1962. The graphical illustration thus provides weak
evidence of a return on higher education in terms of self-reported health. Consistent with
the graphical evidence, the regression result shows little causal effect of higher education.
Accordingly, Columns (1)-(3) of Table 3.3 report the results for estimating Equation (2)
using a dummy variable indicating self reported health being poor as an outcome variable
for various specifications. For all specifications, the coefficient of interest is close to zero and
statistically insignificant, a result that indicates little discrete change in the proportion of
individuals reporting their health as poor at the birth year cutoff.
Furthermore, we do not find evidence that higher education attainment reduces the prob-
ability of having chronic diseases. The lower panel of Figure 3.3 describes the raw relation
between the birth cohort and the probability of having chronic diseases. As expected, a
strong negative linear relation exists between the two. However, we do not observe a dis-
crete change in the fraction of individuals with chronic diseases at the birth year cutoff. In
particular, despite a large and a discrete increase in the higher education attainment at the
birth year cutoff, the fraction of the individuals with chronic conditions does not exhibit a
notable discrete decrease at the birth year cutoff. Similar to the graphical evidence, the esti-
mated coefficient of Treat in Columns (4)-(6) of Table 3.3 which quantify the discrete change
in the fraction of individuals with disease at the birth year cutoff is statistically insignificant.
Overall, consistent with some recent literature on health return for K-12 education, we do
not find supportive evidence for health return from post-secondary education.
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3.5.3 Health Behaviors
We now turn our focus to such health behaviors as smoking and drinking that are known
to have a negative effect on health. Specifically, we examine the effect of higher education
not only on the incidence of smoking and drinking but also on the intensity of such behaviors.
First, we find that education does not affect the probability of currently smoking. This
result is consistent with some recent literature (Park and Kang, 2008; Clark and Royer,
2013). Columns (1)-(3) in Table 3.4 summarize the results from estimating Equation (2)
with a binary outcome variable that indicates whether the individual is currently smoking.
The coefficient of interest is statistically insignificant, which implies little causal effect of
education on the probability of currently smoking. Moreover, we find little support for the
effect of college education on ever smoking. As shown in Columns (4)-(6) in Table 3.4,
the estimated coefficient indicating the impact of higher education on probability of ever
smoking is statistically indistinguishable from zero for all specifications. Figure 3.4 describes
the relation regarding the proportion of a cohort who currently smoke or ever smoked.
Although there is a kink—a change in the slope—at the birth year cutoff, it is difficult to
observe a discrete drop in the proportion of individuals who do not currently smoke or ever
smoked at the birth year cutoff.
However, for those who smoked, we find that college education reduces the average num-
ber of cigarettes smoked per day. In particular, the probability of smoking more than 10
cigarettes per day is discretely reduced at the birth year cutoff. The upper panel of Figure
3.4 describes the fraction of individuals that smokes more than 10 cigarettes per day by birth
cohorts. We verify a discrete drop in the fraction at the birth year cutoff. Columns (1)-(3)
in Table 3.5, show that there is an approximately 8 percent point discrete decrease in the
probability of smoking more than 10 cigarettes per day for the cohorts who have a discretely
higher probability of obtaining college educations.
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We also explore the causal effect of higher education on drinking behaviors such as
whether a person is currently drinking. The first three columns of Table 3.6 summarize
the results for the reduced form effect of education on the probability of currently drink-
ing. The result is consistent with Figure 3.6 which exhibits a small discrete change in the
probability of currently drinking. In particular, we find that having a college education is
not negatively associated with the probability of currently drinking. Moreover, we find that
the birth cohort who exhibits a discretely higher probability of a having higher education is
more likely to consume alcohol frequently. Columns (4)-(6) of Table 3.6 report the reduced
form effects of higher education on the frequency of alcohol consumption. The coefficient is
positive and statistically significant for all specifications implying the positive causal effect
of higher education on probability of drinking more than twice a week. This result might
be due to fact that, in Korea, college graduates are more likely to be economically active
(Park and Son, 2013) and drinking is an essential social activity in work life (Park and Kang,
2008).
Unlike the smoking behavior, we find that, for those who drink, college education does
not affect the amount of alcohol consumption per occasion. In particular, Table 3.7 reports
whether higher education affects the probability of having more than a certain number of
drinks per occasion. Columns (1)-(3) and Columns (4)-(6) summarize the causal effect of
higher education on the probability of having more than two glasses and more than seven
glasses of alcoholic beverage per occasion, respectively.
For all specifications, the estimate of the main coefficient is small and statistically in-
significant, indicating little causal effect of the higher education on the amount of drinking
per occasion. Figure 3.7 illustrates the trend in the fraction of individuals who drink more
than two glasses and more than seven glasses, respectively, per occasion across the birth
cohorts. One can verify a little evidence of a discrete decrease in each proportion at the
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birth year cutoff, which is consistent with the regression result.
Taken together, the results in this subsection could shed light on the reason for having
little health return from higher education. That is, if higher education attainment does not
induce healthier behaviors, one might not expect the causal effect of higher education on
health. Specifically, one of the commonly acknowledged channels likely to affect individ-
ual health is that of increased income of the individuals with higher education. However,
Clark and Royer (2013) recently shows that increased income may negatively affect health
because individuals with higher incomes could consume more cigarettes and alcohol. That
is, individuals with higher education could consume more alcohol because they have higher
wages than their counterparts with lower educations (Park and Son, 2013). If this is the
case, it could possibly negate the potential health gain from the monetary return to higher
education attainment.
3.6 Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper, we examine the causal effect of education on health. Despite the well-
documented positive correlation between education and health, it is not clear whether this
correlation reflects the causal effect of education because of the endogeneity in educational
attainment. To address the endogeneity, we exploit the education reform in Korea which
was motivated by political reasons. The education reform discretely increased the admis-
sion openings for college education and abolished costly college-specific entrance exam. In
addition, the reform prohibited private tutoring that disproportionately gives advantage to
students from affluent backgrounds. This education reform along with the compulsory school
entrance law created a sharp disparity in the opportunities to obtain college education across
adjacent cohorts among the disadvantaged population. Using the policy, we apply the re-
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gression discontinuity design to compare the education and health outcomes across otherwise
comparable cohorts. We rely on the mild and reasonable assumption that underlying char-
acteristics that could affected higher education attainment do not change discretely across
adjacent cohorts.
Using the KOWEPS data, we confirm a discrete increase in the fraction of individuals
with some college education and college degree in the birth cohort initially affected by the
reform. However, we find little supportive evidence for the causal effect of higher education
on health related outcomes. Despite the discrete increase in higher education attainment
at the birth year cutoff, we do not observe a discrete change at the birth year cutoff in the
fraction of individuals who reported their health status as poor or who have chronic diseases.
Furthermore, we do not find evidence that higher education induces healthier behaviors. The
causal link between having a higher education and the probability of currently smoking or
ever having smoked is documented as weak. In addition, we do not find supportive evidence
that having a higher education negatively affects the frequency or the amount of alcohol
consumption of individuals.
Overall, the magnitude of the causal link between higher education and health docu-
mented in this paper is consistent with the recent literature that questions the health return
from K-12 education. In particular, our results suggest using caution when interpreting the
relation between health and higher education attainment as the positive relation might result
largely from the endogeneity in education and/or reverse causality between the two.
Finally, it is important to note that the effect of higher education on health documented
in this paper is not the population-average effect. In other words, the casual effect of higher
education might be different for the average individuals, since the estimate provided in this
paper is based on the individuals who obtain college education due to the reform in 1980.
In particular, the individuals who became college graduates were on the right-tail of ability
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distribution—only about 15 percent of the individuals attained college education prior to
the reform. Thus, the effect of college education on health could be different for other parts
of the ability distribution. However, it is not clear whether the effect of education on health
would be smaller or larger at the lower part of the ability distribution.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
edu<=high school graduate edu>=some college or more
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Birth year 23936 1961.681 8.175 4334 1966.486 6.806
Female 23936 0.534 0.499 4334 0.359 0.480
Health poor 23924 0.134 0.341 4327 0.036 0.186
Have disease 23897 0.421 0.494 4330 0.266 0.442
Currently smoke 23936 0.271 0.444 4334 0.237 0.425
Ever smoke 13151 0.404 0.491 2327 0.440 0.496
Smoke>=10 cigarettes 8203 0.707 0.455 1502 0.612 0.487
Smoke>=20 cigarettes 8203 0.147 0.354 1502 0.088 0.283
Currently drink 23776 0.630 0.483 4325 0.705 0.456
Drink freq>=twice a week 23776 0.262 0.439 4325 0.264 0.441
Drink freq>=four times a week 23776 0.091 0.288 4325 0.064 0.245
Drink amount>=two drinks 14401 0.751 0.432 2999 0.792 0.406
Drink amount>=seven drinks 14401 0.361 0.480 2999 0.392 0.488
Employed 23932 0.654 0.476 4333 0.808 0.394
Residence urban 23936 0.894 0.307 4334 0.951 0.215
Married 23936 0.836 0.371 4334 0.912 0.283
Father’s edu>=middle 23936 0.136 0.343 4334 0.360 0.480
Mother’s edu>=middle 23936 0.051 0.220 4334 0.120 0.326
Notes Table is based on the pooled waves of KOWEPS. All summary statistics are based on cohorts whose birth years were 15
years before and after 1962. Obs is the number of observation and Std. Dev. stands for standard deviation. Health poor
indicates whether individual’s self reporting health is poor. Smoke>=10 cigarettes and Smoke>=20 cigarettes take value
equal to one if the sample smokes more than 10 and 20 cigarettes per day, respectively. Drink freq is the frequency of alcohol
consumption per week and Drink amount is the number of drinks consumed at one occasion. Father’s edu>=middle and
Mother’s edu>=middle is a dummy variable for parent’s education attainment being more than primary education.
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Table 3.2: Impact of Education Reform on Higher Education Attainment
Dependent variable edu>=some college edu>=college graduate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat 0.071*** 0.067*** 0.069*** 0.063*** 0.060*** 0.058***
(0.020) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) (0.018)
Cubic Spline Y Y Y Y Y Y
Additional Control Y Y Y Y
Predetermined Variables Y Y
adj. R-sq 0.084 0.173 0.244 0.082 0.173 0.257
N 28270 28265 28265 28270 28265 28265
Notes:
The table reports the estimated effect of the education reform on higher education attainment. All summary statistics are
based on cohorts whose birth years were 15 years before and after 1962. All specifications include a cubic spline of birth year
centered on 1962, year fixed effects and controls for sex and age square. Specifications (2) and (5) additionally control for time
varying characteristics of individuals such as location of residence, marital status and economic activity. Additionally,
specifications (3) and (6) control for predetermined variables such as parent’s education attainment and economic status
during youth. The standard errors are clustered at the birth cohort level. Treat is defined as 1 for individuals born on or after
January 1, 1962 and 0 for individuals born on or before December 31, 1961
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
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Table 3.3: Effect of Higher Education on Health
Dependent variable health poor have disease
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat 0.017 0.021 0.023 0.015 0.018 0.008
(0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.057) (0.054) (0.051)
Cubic Spline Y Y Y Y Y Y
Additional Control Y Y Y Y
Predetermined Variables Y Y
adj. R-sq 0.070 0.118 0.124 0.151 0.163 0.182
N 28251 28250 28250 28227 28226 28226
Notes: The estimates report the reduced-form effect of higher education on health by comparing the health outcome of the
individuals across the birth year cutoff. All summary statistics are based on cohorts whose birth years were 15 years before
and after 1962. All specifications include a cubic spline of birth year centered on 1962, year fixed effects and controls for sex
and age square. Specifications (2) and (5) additionally control for time varying characteristics of individuals such as location
of residence, marital status and economic activity. Additionally, specifications (3) and (6) control for predetermined variables
such as parent’s education attainment and economic status during youth. The standard errors are clustered at the birth
cohort level. Treat is defined as 1 for individuals born on or after January 1, 1962 and 0 for individuals born on or before
December 31, 1961
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
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Table 3.4: Effect of Higher Education on Incidence of Smoking
Dependent variable currently smoke ever smoke
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treat 0.043 0.044 0.048 0.028 0.025 0.028
(0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Cubic Spline Y Y Y Y Y Y
Additional Control Y Y Y Y
Predetermined Variables Y Y
adj. R-sq 0.297 0.322 0.326 0.584 0.593 0.596
N 28270 28265 28265 15478 15477 15477
Notes: Information about ever having smoked is available in the third wave of the KOWEPS. All summary statistics are
based on cohorts whose birth years were 15 years before and after 1962. All specifications include a cubic spline of birth year
centered on 1962, year fixed effects and controls for sex and age square. Specifications (2) and (5) additionally control for time
varying characteristics of individuals such as location of residence, marital status and economic activity. Additionally,
specifications (3) and (6) control for predetermined variables such as parent’s education attainment and economic status
during youth. The standard errors are clustered at the birth cohort level. Treat is defined as 1 for individuals born on or after
January 1, 1962 and 0 for individuals born on or before December 31, 1961
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
Table 3.5: Effect of Higher Education on Amount of Smoking
Dependent variable smoke>=10 cigarettes smoke>=20 cigarettes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat -0.070 -0.088** -0.091** -0.049 -0.054 -0.047
(0.042) (0.039) (0.042) (0.036) (0.036) (0.033)
Cubic Spline Y Y Y Y Y Y
Additional Control Y Y Y Y
Predetermined Variables Y Y
adj. R-sq 0.021 0.047 0.058 0.006 0.027 0.032
N 9705 9705 9705 9705 9705 9705
Notes: The regression results are based on the sample that currently smoke. All specifications include a cubic spline of birth
year centered on 1962, year fixed effects and controls for sex and age square. Specifications (2) and (5) additionally control for
time varying characteristics of individuals such as location of residence, marital status and economic activity. Additionally,
specifications (3) and (6) control for predetermined variables such as parent’s education attainment and economic status
during youth. The standard errors are clustered at the birth cohort level. Treat is defined as 1 for individuals born on or after
January 1, 1962 and 0 for individuals born on or before December 31, 1961
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
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Table 3.6: Effect of Higher Education on Frequency of Drinking
Dependent variable currently drink drink more than twice a week
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat 0.028 0.029 0.017 0.068** 0.061** 0.055*
(0.022) (0.019) (0.022) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Cubic Spline Y Y Y Y Y Y
Additional Control Y Y Y Y
Predetermined Variables Y Y
adj. R-sq 0.166 0.187 0.172 0.177 0.195 0.174
N 28101 28100 28100 28101 28100 28100
Notes: All specifications include a cubic spline of birth year centered on 1962, year fixed effects and controls for sex and age
square. Specifications (2) and (5) additionally control for time varying characteristics of individuals such as location of
residence, marital status and economic activity. Additionally, specifications (3) and (6) control for predetermined variables
such as parent’s education attainment and economic status during youth. The standard errors are clustered at the birth
cohort level. Treat is defined as 1 for individuals born on or after January 1, 1962 and 0 for individuals born on or before
December 31, 1961
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
Table 3.7: Effect of Higher Education on Amount of Drinking
Dependent variable Drink amount>=two drinks Drink amount>=seven drinks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat -0.006 -0.004 -0.003 0.011 0.012 0.021
(0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.052) (0.058) (0.057)
Cubic Spline Y Y Y Y Y Y
Additional Control Y Y Y Y
Predetermined Variables Y Y
adj. R-sq 0.188 0.199 0.206 0.180 0.192 0.198
N 17400 17400 17400 17400 17400 17400
Notes: The regression results are based on the sample that currently drink. All specifications include a cubic spline of birth
year centered on 1962, year fixed effects and controls for sex and age square. Specifications (2) and (5) additionally control for
time varying characteristics of individuals such as location of residence, marital status and economic activity. Additionally,
specifications (3) and (6) control for predetermined variables such as parent’s education attainment and economic status
during youth. The standard errors are clustered at the birth cohort level. Treat is defined as 1 for individuals born on or after
January 1, 1962 and 0 for individuals born on or before December 31, 1961
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
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Figure 3.1: Density of observation across cohorts
Notes: The sample is based on the pooled waves of KOWEPS data. The solid line in the graph plots the kernel density of
observation in our sample.
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Figure 3.2: Impact of Education Reform on Higher Education Attainment
(a) Panel A : education>some college or more
(b) Panel B : education<college graduate or more
Notes: All panels are based on cohorts whose birth years were 15 years before and after 1962. The solid circles indicate the
means among individuals in each birth year cohort. The solid line in the graph represents the Lowess line fitted separately for
each side of birth year cutoff.
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Figure 3.3: Effect of Higher Education on Self-reported Health
(a) Panel A : self-reported health poor
(b) Panel B : have disease
Notes: All panels are based on cohorts whose birth years were 15 years before and after 1962. The solid circles indicate the
means among individuals in each birth year cohort. The solid line in the graph represents the Lowess line fitted separately for
each side of birth year cutoff.
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Figure 3.4: Impact of Higher Education on Incidence of Smoking
(a) Panel A : currently smoke
(b) Panel B : ever smoke
Notes: All panels are based on cohorts whose birth years were 15 years before and after 1962. The solid circles indicate the
means among individuals in each birth year cohort. The solid line in the graph represents the Lowess line fitted separately for
each side of birth year cutoff.
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Figure 3.5: Effect of Higher education on Amount of Smoking
(a) Panel A : smoke more than 10 cigarettes per day
(b) Panel B : smoke more than 20 cigarettes per day
Notes: All panels are based on the individuals whose birth years were 15 years before and after 1962 and those who currently
smoke. The solid circles indicate the means among individuals in each birth year cohort. The solid line in the graph
represents the Lowess line fitted separately for each side of birth year cutoff.
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Figure 3.6: Impact of Higher Education on Frequency of Drinking
(a) Panel A : currently drink
(b) Panel B : drink more than twice a week
Notes:All panels are based on cohorts whose birth years were 15 years before and after 1962. The solid circles indicate the
means among individuals in each birth year cohort. The solid line in the graph represents the Lowess line fitted separately for
each side of birth year cutoff.
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Figure 3.7: Impact of Higher Education on Amount of Drinking
(a) Panel A : drink more than two drinks per occasion
(b) Panel B : drink more than seven drinks per occasion
Notes: All panels are based on cohorts whose birth years were 15 years before and after 1962 and those who currently drink.
The solid circles indicate the means among individuals in each birth year cohort. The solid line in the graph represents the
Lowess line fitted separately for each side of birth year cutoff.
Bibliography
Acemoglu, D. and J. Angrist (2000). How large are human-capital externalities? evidence
from compulsory-schooling laws. In NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, Volume 15,
NBER Chapters, pp. 9–74. National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Albouy, V. and L. Lequien (2009, January). Does compulsory education lower mortality?
Journal of Health Economics 28 (1), 155–168.
Almond, D. and J. Currie (2011). Human capital development before age five. Volume 4 of
Handbook of Labor Economics, Chapter 15, pp. 1315–1486. Elsevier.
Angrist, J. D. and A. B. Krueger (1991). Does compulsory school attendance affect schooling
and earnings? The Quarterly Journal of Economics 106 (4), 979–1014.
Arcidiacono, P., P. Bayer, and A. Hizmo (2010). Beyond signaling and human capital: Edu-
cation and the revelation of ability. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2 (4),
76–104.
Belman, D. and J. S. Heywood (1991, November). Sheepskin effects in the returns to edu-
cation: An examination on women and minorities. The Review of Economics and Statis-
tics 73 (4), 720–24.
Björkman, M. (2006, March). Income shocks and gender gaps in education: Evidence from
uganda. Seminar Papers 744, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic
Studies.
Card, D. (1993, Oct.). Using geographic variation in college proximity to estimate the return
to schooling. NBER Working Paper 4483.
Card, D. (1999). The causal effect of education on earnings. In O. Ashenfelter and D. Card
(Eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3 of Handbook of Labor Economics, Chap-
ter 30, pp. 1801–1863. Elsevier.
Clark, D. and H. Royer (2013). The effect of education on adult mortality and health:
Evidence from britain. American Economic Review 103 (6), 2087–2120.
121
122
Currie, J. and E. Moretti (2003). Mother’s education and the intergenerational transmis-
sion of human capital: Evidence from college openings. The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 118 (4), 1495–1532.
Cutler, D. and A. Lleras-Muney (2008). Education and Health: Evaluating Theories and
Evidence. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Cutler, D. M. and A. Lleras-Muney (2010). Understanding differences in health behaviors
by education. Journal of Health Economics 29 (1), 1–28.
de Walque, D. (2007). Does education affect smoking behaviors?: Evidence using the vietnam
draft as an instrument for college education. Journal of Health Economics 26 (5), 877–895.
Duryea, S. and M. Arends-Kuenning (2003, July). School attendance, child labor and local
labor market fluctuations in urban brazil. World Development 31 (7), 1165–1178.
Dynan, K. E., J. Skinner, and S. P. Zeldes (2004, April). Do the Rich Save More? Journal
of Political Economy 112 (2), 397–444.
Hahn, J., P. Todd, and W. Van der Klaauw (2001). Identification and estimation of treatment
effects with a regression-discontinuity design. Econometrica 69 (1), 201–09.
Hungerford, T. and G. Solon (1987, February). Sheepskin effects in the returns to education.
The Review of Economics and Statistics 69 (1), 175–77.
Imbens, G. W. and T. Lemieux (2008). Regression discontinuity designs: A guide to practice.
Journal of Econometrics 142 (2), 615–635.
Iranzo, S. and G. Peri (2009). Schooling externalities, technology, and productivity: Theory
and evidence from u.s. states. The Review of Economics and Statistics 91 (2), 420–431.
Jacoby, H. G. (1994, February). Borrowing constraints and progress through school: Evi-
dence from peru. The Review of Economics and Statistics 76 (1), 151–60.
Jaeger, D. A. and M. E. Page (1996, November). Degrees matter: New evidence on sheepskin
effects in the returns to education. The Review of Economics and Statistics 78 (4), 733–40.
Jensen, R. (2000, May). Agricultural volatility and investments in children. American
Economic Review 90 (2), 399–404.
Jensen, R. (2010, May). The (perceived) returns to education and the demand for schooling.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 125 (2), 515–548.
Jensen, R. (2012). Do labor market opportunities affect young women’s work and family
decisions? experimental evidence from india. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 127 (2),
753–792.
123
Jones, G. and P. Hagul (2001). Schooling in indonesia: Crisis-related and longer-term issues.
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 37 (2), 207–231.
Kahn, L. B. (2010, April). The long-term labor market consequences of graduating from
college in a bad economy. Labour Economics 17 (2), 303–316.
Kaur, S. (2012). Nominal wage rigidity in village labor markets. mimeograph, Harvard
University .
Lee, D. S. and D. Card (2008). Regression discontinuity inference with specification error.
Journal of Econometrics 142 (2), 655–674.
Lee, D. S. and T. Lemieux (2010). Regression discontinuity designs in economics. Journal
of Economic Literature 48 (2), 281–355.
Lleras-Muney, A. (2005). The relationship between education and adult mortality in the
united states. The Review of Economic Studies 72 (1), 189–221.
Maccini, S. and D. Yang (2009, June). Under the weather: Health, schooling, and economic
consequences of early-life rainfall. American Economic Review 99 (3), 1006–26.
MacLeod, W. B. and M. Urquiola (2009, June). Anti-lemons: School reputation and edu-
cational quality. NBER Working Papers 15112, National Bureau of Economic Research,
Inc.
Malamud, O. and C. Pop-Eleches (2010). General education versus vocational training:
Evidence from an economy in transition. The Review of Economics and Statistics 92 (1),
43–60.
Malamud, O. and C. Pop-Eleches (2011). School tracking and access to higher education
among disadvantaged groups. Journal of Public Economics 95 (11), 1538–1549.
McCrary, J. (2008, February). Manipulation of the running variable in the regression dis-
continuity design: A density test. Journal of Econometrics 142 (2), 698–714.
Oreopoulos, P. (2006). Estimating average and local average treatment effects of education
when compulsory schooling laws really matter. American Economic Review 96 (1), 152–
175.
Oreopoulos, P. (2007). Do dropouts drop out too soon? wealth, health and happiness from
compulsory schooling. Journal of Public Economics 91 (11-12), 2213–2229.
Oreopoulos, P., T. von Wachter, and A. Heisz (2012a). The short- and long-term career effects
of graduating in a recession. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 4 (1), 1–29.
124
Oreopoulos, P., T. von Wachter, and A. Heisz (2012b). The short- and long-term career
effects of graduating in a recession. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 4 (1),
1–29.
Oster, E. and B. M. Steinberg (2013). Do it service centers promote school enrollment?
evidence from india. Journal of Development Economics 104 (0), 123–135.
Park, C. and C. Kang (2008). Does education induce healthy lifestyle? Journal of Health
Economics 27 (6), 1516–1531.
Park, J. H. (1994, August). Estimation of sheepskin effects and returns to schooling using he
old and the new cps measures of educational attainment. Working Papers 717, Princeton
University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.
Park, W. and H. Son (2013). The impact of college education on labor market and non-
pecuniary outcomes.
Psacharopoulos, G. (1994, September). Returns to investment in education: A global update.
World Development 22 (9), 1325–1343.
Sander, W. (1995a). Schooling and quitting smoking. The Review of Economics and Statis-
tics 77 (1), 191–99.
Sander, W. (1995b). Schooling and smoking. Economics of Education Review 14 (1), 23–33.
Shin, H. and S.-J. Kim (2013). Financing growth without banks: Korean housing repo
contract. 2013 Meeting Papers 328, Society for Economic Dynamics.
Skoufias, E., B. Essama-Nssah, and R. S. Katayama (2011, March). Too little too late
: welfare impacts of rainfall shocks in rural indonesia. Policy Research Working Paper
Series 5615, The World Bank.
Thomas, D., K. Beegle, E. Frankenberg, B. Sikoki, J. Strauss, and G. Teruel (2004, June).
Education in a crisis. Journal of Development Economics 74 (1), 53–85.
Tyler, J. H., R. J. Murnane, and J. B. Willett (2000, May). Estimating the labor market




Appendix for Chapter 1
127
Figure A.1: Farm Revenue by Rainfall Decile
Notes:
1. This figure illustrates a non parametric relationship between post-onset rainfall decile and farm revenue for the agricultural
households in the sample.
2. Dependent variable is log farm revenue, regressed on decile dummies and controls including year and district fixed effects.
3. The figure plots coefficient estimate for each decile dummy and its 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered
at the district level.
4. I define rainfall shock if it falls in the first decile of the historical distribution, consistent with this figure. A regression of
log farm revenue on the dummy for the first decile with controls provides a negative coefficient estimate on shock with an
10.99 F-stat value.
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Figure A.2: Differential Responses to Financial Crisis Shocks by Grade
Notes:
1. This figure illustrates the differential response to crisis-led income shocks by each grade.
1. 2. Grade 9 refers to the last grade of junior and high school. The sample consists of students enrolled between grade 6 and
10 in 1997/1998 school year. Sample construction details in section 5.4.
3. Shock is defined to indicate households at the bottom 5 percentile of the pre crisis income distribution (year 1997 income
distribution) who were most affected by the Asian financial crisis.
3. The Figure plots the coefficients on the interaction terms of shock and grade dummies from the following equation, δj ,
labeled as grsj for each grade j and the corresponding 95% confidence intervals :
Enrolliht = α+ βShockht +
∑12
j=2 γj1(gradeit = j) +
∑12
j=2 δj1(gradeit = j) ∗ Shockht +Xiht + εiht
4. Enrolliht is probability of enrollment in the subsequent school year conditional on enrollment in a given year.
1(gradeit = j) is a dummy for students entering grade j. The omitted grade category is grade 7.
5. Standard errors are clustered at the household level.
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Figure A.3: Household Head’s Education Level by Grade
Notes:
1.This figure displays the mean of household head’s education level for the sample of students who are enrolled in a given
grade.
2. Household head’s completed education level is categorized to take a value of 0 for less than elementary school, 1 for
elementary school, 2 for junior high school, 3 for senior high school, 4 for college or more.
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Table A.1: Correlation between Students’ Grade and Timing of Income Shocks
Dependent Variable: Indicator for Shock Incidence
Shock Type Combined Shock Unemployment Crop Loss
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Last -0.0066 -0.0034 -0.0040 -0.0065 -0.0054 0.0016
(0.0041) (0.0076) (0.0025) (0.0051) (0.0061) (0.0155)
LastxES -0.0057 0.0029 -0.0098
(0.0095) (0.0060) (0.0173)
LastxJH -0.0021 0.0034 -0.0058
(0.0104) (0.0066) (0.0182)
Observations 12,885 12,885 12,876 12,876 6,784 6,784
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes:
1. This table tests whether the identifying assumption holds: whether the timing of household income shock is uncorrelated
with whether the student is entering the last grade.
2. The dependent variable is binary variable that indicters whether household suffers a negative income shock.
3. Each regression includes year and district fixed effects and controls. Standard errors are clustered at household level.
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Table A.2: Grade Progression
School Year Grade Progression
1997/1998 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th
1998/1999 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th
1999/2000 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th college/stop school
Notes:
1.This table presents grade advancement of students enrolled in 1997/1998 school year until 1999/2000 school year if they
follow normal progression path.
Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
Figure B.1: Percentage of Population with tertiary education by age group(2009)
Source: OECD Education at a Glance 2011
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(a) Panel A : basic controls
(b) Panel B : full controls
Figure B.2: Average Log Monthly Savings
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(a) Panel A : Disadvantaged Sample
(b) Panel B : Advantaged Sample
Figure B.3: Wage Profile Comparison
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Table B.1: Effect of College Education on Household Savings Behavior
Dependent variable Log Monthly Savings
(1) (2) (3)
treat 0.3952*** 0.3997*** 0.3858***
(0.0900) (0.0869) (0.0864)
Linear Spline Y Y Y
Additional Control Y Y
Predetermined Variables Y
adj. R-sq 0.0509 0.0807 0.0877
N 15133 15133 15133
Notes:
All specification includes birth cohort and interaction between birth cohort and treat variable. Specification (2) and (5)
controls for location or residence and dummy variables for class of workers. Addition ally, specification (3) and (6) controls for
predetermined variables such as parent’s education. The standard errors are clustered at the birth cohort level. Treat is
defined as 1 for individuals born on or after January 1, 1962 and 0 for individuals born on or before December 31, 1961
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
Table B.2: Effect of College Education on Home Ownership
Dependent variable Dwelling Ownership (current residence) Home Ownership (regardless of residence)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treat -0.0225 -0.0178 -0.0175 0.0070 0.0107 0.0072
(0.0315) (0.0292) (0.0303) (0.0311) (0.0303) (0.0306)
Linear Spline Y Y Y Y Y Y
Additional Control Y Y Y Y
Predetermined Variables Y Y
adj. R-sq 0.1220 0.1460 0.1551 0.1235 0.1465 0.1555
N 15219 15219 15219 15228 15228 15228
Notes:
All specification includes birth cohort and interaction between birth cohort and treat variable. Specification (2) and (5)
controls for location or residence and dummy variables for class of workers. Addition ally, specification (3) and (6) controls for
predetermined variables such as parent’s education. The standard errors are clustered at the birth cohort level. Treat is
defined as 1 for individuals born on or after January 1, 1962 and 0 for individuals born on or before December 31, 1961
*** statistical significance at the 99% level
** statistical significance at 95% level
* statistical significance at 90% level
